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ABSTRACT
New technologies such as distributed generation and electric vehicles are connecting to the
electricity distribution grid, a regulated natural monopoly. Existing regulatory schemes were not
designed for these new technologies and may not provide distribution companies with adequate
remuneration to integrate the new technologies.
To investigate how regulation should change in the presence of new technologies, current
regulatory schemes and possible improvements to make them suitable for new technologies are
reviewed. A Reference Network Model capable of calculating the costs of building a distribution
network is utilized to compare the costs of accommodating different penetrations and locations
of distributed generation. Results for residential generators with a 3 kW/unit power output show
that as the penetration of generators among residential customers increases, costs initially
decrease but then increase at higher penetration levels. A comparison of results for residential
generators with results for distributed generator conurbations located far away from customers
shows that residential and far away generators require similar investment costs when total
distributed generation power output is lower than effective customer demand. However, when
total distributed generation power output exceeds effective demand, residential generators
necessitate higher investment costs than far away generators. At all levels of distributed
generation power output, residential generators imply lower losses costs than far away
generators.
A second Reference Network Model capable of calculating the costs of expanding an existing
distribution network is utilized to compare the costs of expanding a network to accommodate
new technologies under different technology management approaches. Results show that
network investment costs are lower for an actively managed network than for a passively
managed network, illustrating the potential benefits of active management.
Based on an analysis of the modeling results and the regulatory review, an ex ante schedule of
charges for distributed generators that incorporates forecast levels of DG penetration is suggested
to improve remuneration adequacy for the costs of integrating distributed generation. To promote
active management of distribution networks, measures such as funding pots, outputs-focused
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regulatory schemes, and regulating total expenditure rather than separating the regulation of
capital and operating expenditure are selected as proposals.
Thesis Supervisor: Ignacio J. Perez-Arriaga
Title: Visiting Professor, Engineering Systems Division
Thesis Supervisor: Richard L. Schmalensee
Title: Professor of Economics and Management
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The ongoing introduction of new technologies such as distributed generation and electric
vehicles makes new demands on electric grids. Many of these technologies are connected to the
electric distribution grid, a regulated natural monopoly, so distribution grid companies and their
regulators must ensure the appropriate investments in infrastructure and operations are made to
accommodate the new technologies. But existing schemes for economic regulation of the
distribution grid were not designed for the widespread integration of these new technologies.
They may not provide distribution companies with sufficient remuneration to integrate the new
technologies. This study addresses the question: how should distribution grid regulation change
in the presence of new technologies?
To provide background on existing distribution regulation schemes, the study will begin
by introducing the regulation of the natural monopolies in distribution grids. The need for and
goals of distribution grid regulation will be introduced along with the common regulatory
schemes in use today and their advantages and disadvantages. Regulatory issues especially
pertinent to distribution grids such as the regulation of losses and quality of service will be
discussed. Subsequently, the study will take a three-step approach to developing proposals for
better regulation.
In the first step, the study will build on the introductory discussion of regulation to
analyze several areas in which conventional regulatory schemes are inadequate to regulate the
integration of new technologies. It will then review new methods that are emerging or have been
proposed to regulate the distribution grid in the presence of new technologies.
In the second step, the study will employ two types of Reference Network Model (RNM)
to determine the costs of integrating new technologies. The models will be used to calculate the
distribution grid investment and losses costs necessary to accommodate various combinations of
new technologies and different technology management approaches. The investment and losses
cost trends will provide valuable insights as to how regulation of remuneration ought to change
under different scenarios.
In the third step, the study will consider how, once costs have been determined, the
payments needed to remunerate the companies should be allocated among different customer
groups and the money recovered from them. The interaction between regulation of cost
allocation and recovery and regulation of remuneration, or total allowed revenue, will be
11
discussed. Cost recovery methods in use for distributed generation will be reviewed and several
additional methods will be suggested and detailed.
Finally, the review of regulatory methods for new technologies, the results from the
modeling analyses and the discussion of remuneration and cost recovery issues will be combined
to select, develop and support appropriate regulatory proposals.
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Chapter 1: Regulating Electricity
Distribution
13
1.1 Why Regulate Electricity Distribution?
Electricity distribution is a natural monopoly. Several features of the distribution business
characterize it as a natural monopoly: it is capital intensive, owing to the high cost of investment
in network lines and equipment that are normally expected to last many years. When a
distribution company has built and is operating the wires network in an area, it benefits from the
lower costs of expanding its existing network to serve additional customers whereas a
distribution company seeking to enter that market as a new entrant would experience the higher
costs of building its own network from scratch to serve the same customers. There is also a social
cost to having more than one distribution company in an area since such a situation implies
multiple parties constructing overhead and underground physical lines, causing public
inconvenience and possibly disrupting everyday business in the area. Thus, a single company
holds a natural monopoly on building and operating the electricity distribution network in the
area it serves. As in all monopolies, the danger exists that the monopolist will raise prices above
the socially efficient level since there is no competitive pressure to lower prices.
Regulation of the natural monopolies in electricity distribution can have many goals;
three important ones that are particularly pertinent to this study are described here. The first
could be described as economic sustainability: The regulator attempts to ensure that the
distribution company is remunerated by a total revenue amount, via the prices charged for its
electricity distribution service, that is sufficient to finance its operations, obtain a suitable rate of
return, and survive as a business while providing an acceptable level of quality of service. A
good regulatory scheme aims to provide adequate remuneration while simultaneously
incentivizing the company to improve cost and operating efficiency. Regulation should also help
insure the company is not overcharging customers to obtain an unreasonable level of profits. A
second, closely related goal is service quality in itself: The regulator has to allow sufficient
remuneration to maintain acceptable service quality, as described above. Regulators may employ
additional targets, incentives, or penalties to ensure that the necessary investments are made to
provide an acceptable level of quality of service. Because distribution grid quality of service and
losses are particularly pertinent for electric distribution grids integrating new technologies, this
goal is discussed separately from the first one and detailed later in this chapter. A third goal is
equity: The regulator attempts to allocate the costs of the grid equitably among grid users
14
(customers) so that the costs of electricity distribution are recovered in a fair manner from them
via the appropriate tariffs.
Regulators employ a variety of regulatory schemes to achieve the first goal, allowing an
appropriate level of remuneration. Two of the most important schemes in electricity distribution
regulation are cost of service regulation and incentive regulation. Cost of service regulation is
now mostly used in the US and incentive regulation is mostly used in Europe, owing to a variety
of historical factors. Both schemes are detailed later in this chapter but in brief, cost of service
regulation attempts to remunerate companies for the prudent costs incurred in providing
distribution service while incentive regulation caps the price or revenue companies may charge
or recover, in such a way that companies are encouraged to improve cost efficiency.
Cost of service and incentive regulatory schemes do not come without drawbacks. One
problem common to both schemes is information asymmetry between the regulator and the
regulated firm. The regulator does not know what the most efficient costs of the regulated firm
should be, so the regulatory process may allow a rate of return higher than what is socially
efficient. Other drawbacks are inherent to the different designs of the schemes. Cost of service
regulation can provide an incentive for companies to overinvest in capital so as to earn higher
returns, whereas incentive regulation can provide an incentive for companies to cut costs below
the socially efficient level necessary to provide acceptable service. This chapter will describe the
development, application and drawbacks of both cost of service and incentive regulation, with
examples drawn from the countries where they are used.
The second goal of regulation, ensuring an acceptable level of service, largely relates to
regulating two technical aspects of electric distribution grid systems: losses and quality of
service. It can be challenging to ensure the appropriate investments are made to reduce line
losses in the process of electricity distribution and quality of service problems such as
interruptions in electricity service. The distribution company has to be incentivized, for example
through targets and rewards, to make the appropriate investments to mitigate these issues. When
new technologies connect to the grid, they can have positive and negative effects on losses and
quality of service. For example, the variable power output and demand of distributed generators
and electric vehicles may affect quality of service negatively. But distributed generation may
also help to reduce upstream losses in the electric grid. A more detailed discussion of these
issues can be found later in this chapter and in Chapter 2.
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Regulatory schemes can differ in their approach to achieving the third goal, equitable cost
allocation and recovery. Regulators may allow the recovery of costs from different types of
customers, such as residential or industrial customers, using tariffs that reflect the different costs
to the distribution company of serving these customers. When new technologies connect to the
grid, they may have positive or negative effects on distribution companies' costs, which makes it
more difficult to allocate the costs appropriately among technology owners and network
customers and recover the costs from them in a fair and consistent manner. Therefore, new
technologies pose new problems in cost allocation and recovery which are discussed in Chapter
4.
1.2 Cost of Service Regulation
Regulators must decide how much remuneration a regulated company should be allowed
to recover via its prices. Since distribution companies are natural monopolies it is generally not
possible for a regulator to aim for an outcome representative of price equaling marginal cost
(MC), the competitive outcome, as MC is lower than average cost and the company would not
have sufficient revenue to cover its costs, as shown in Figure 1.
SIQ
I AR
MR
Qm Qr Q, Quantity
Figure 1. Regulation of natural monopoly diagram, showing firm theoretical average cost (AC)
and marginal cost (MC) curves. The firm average revenue (AR) and marginal revenue (MR)
curves are also shown. Regulation can move the quantity sold from the monopoly quantity Qm to
the regulated quantity Qr but not Qc, the quantity under perfect competition as this will not
permit the company sufficient remuneration. Source: Pindyck and Rubinfeld, Microeconomics
(1992), p. 352.
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The regulator should attempt to set price as close to average cost as possible. In electricity
distribution, the classic approach used to achieve this is termed cost of service regulation (also
known as rate-of-return or cost-plus regulation) and it still applies in many states of the US
today.
1.2.1 Cost of Service Regulation: Determining Allowed Revenue
To determine allowed revenue under cost of service regulation, the regulator may utilize
the regulated company's accounting and cost information in combination with his own
regulatory judgment. For example, the regulator may utilize information provided by the
company concerning its assets and operating and maintenance costs in a past year, and its capital
expenditure to provide service to its service territory. The regulator then allows the company a
rate of return on its investments that covers the costs deemed prudent. The rate will also be
adjusted to allow the company reasonable profits, using regulatory judgment and firm and
industry information on profit levels. Crew and Kleindorfer give a general formula for the
allowed revenue under cost of service regulation:
R = 0 + s(V-D)
where R is revenue requirements, 0 is operating expenses, including current depreciation, s is
the allowed rate of return, V is the gross value of utility's property (rate base), and D is the
accumulated depreciation (1986, 98). It is worth highlighting that the rate of return s is applied
on the whole term V-D, or the rate base less depreciation, and that the rate base may include
original and new assets as allowed by the regulator.
The regulator exercises judgment over the allowed rate of return s, what to include in the
rate base V, and the depreciation value D to use. In the US, the rate of return set by the regulator
is generally reviewed when the utility brings a rate case to the regulatory commission. This
usually occurs when a rate increase is sought to cover an increase in expenditure by the
distribution company. In the US, the state regulators of distribution companies (or distribution
utilities) are often called Public Utility Commissions (PUCs), but regulator names and acronyms
vary across US states.
Information asymmetry occurs in cost of service regulation when the regulator has to
decide if the company's spending has really been prudent and if it should be allowed to recover
those costs. It can be difficult to know if the most cost-effective investment was made in a given
situation so that cost recovery should be permitted through the total allowed revenue.
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1.2.2 Cost of Service Regulation Problems: Overinvestment
Cost of service regulation has been criticized for facilitating overinvestments, because the
distribution company is guaranteed a rate of return on their capital and has no incentive to cut
spending. As a result, the cost of service-regulated company will invest in capital even when
doing so is not efficient, and operate at an inefficient level of production (Crew and Kleindorfer
1986, Averch and Johnson 1962). The overinvestment is formally known as the Averch-Johnson
effect.'
When the regulated firm maximizes profit under the cost of service regulatory constraint,
it generally does not minimize its costs. The regulator sets an allowed rate of return on capital.
When the firm's effective cost of capital is less than this allowed rate of return, the firm can
increase its total returns by increasing capital investments. The optimal profit-maximizing
solution is for it to substitute capital for labor by overinvesting in capital and increasing the level
of production, as elaborated in Crew and Kleindorfer (1986).
1.2.3 Cost of Service Regulation Problems: Cost Allocation and Recovery
Once allowed remuneration for distribution network costs has been determined by the
regulator according to cost of service principles, the network costs have to be allocated among
network users and money recovered from them to remunerate the distribution company. Costs
may be allocated by the function of the grid utilized (transmission, distribution etc.) or among
different classes of customers (residential, industrial). An equitable solution would be to allocate
costs to users of the grid in proportion to their responsibility for the costs, although doing this is
difficult.
Cost recovery encompasses two main issues: ensuring the amount of money actually
recovered is the same as the regulator's allowed remuneration, and deciding the format of the
prices charged to collect the money from customers. The format of the prices charged can vary
widely; one-time lump sum charges and network tariffs involving fixed and variable charges are
a few examples of methods that can be used. The design of tariffs can be complex and is an area
of academic research and regulatory innovation. In the US in particular, the recovery of fixed
distribution network costs is primarily achieved by volumetric energy charges (Environmental
Protection Agency 2007). This creates a cost recovery situation where fixed costs are recovered
A full derivation and formulae may be found in Crew and Kleindorfer (1986, 121).
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by a charge that varies with energy demand. Especially in the long run, this cost recovery method
can distort companies' incentives to support some new technologies that reduce energy demand
like distributed generation. A fuller discussion of problems with cost recovery methods can be
found in Chapter 4.
1.2.4 Addressing Problems: Performance Based Regulation
Performance based regulation is an umbrella term that has been applied to a variety of
reforms undertaken to improve cost of service regulation in the US. A 1997 review for the
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) defines this term very
broadly to include penalty/reward regulatory schemes for quality of service as well as price or
revenue caps (Synapse Energy Economics for National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners 1997).
The performance based regulation discussed in this study primarily relates to regulatory
measures targeting improvements in the operational performance of the distribution network. An
example of performance based regulation is targets for quality of service, with rewards for
exceeding the targets and penalties for missing them. The application and extent of such
performance based regulation varies widely across US states and even between distribution
companies in the same state. Performance based regulation may also be expanded to include
metrics that support the integration of new technologies.
Case study: The US and deregulation
Cost of service regulation remains widely used in US electric utilities, despite the
drawbacks that have led to its phasing out in Europe. Many European (and other) countries
moved from cost of service to incentive regulation following the unbundling of their electricity
generation and retail sectors from the network activities, and that transition is discussed later in
this chapter. Because the application of cost of service varies so widely among US states, several
states' regulatory systems are summarized in Table 1. Significant points regarding each state are
discussed in the following text.
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Table 1. Distribution regulations in several US states
Massachusetts Florida
Cost of - CoS - CoS - CoS - CoS
Cost of Service Alternative
oi (CoS) with Rate Plans
Serce rate cases (ARP)
Other PerformanceBased Rates
(PBR)
- CoS Rate design - Rates CoS - CoS
ratemaking depends on generally ratemaking ratemaking
Rates - PBR adjusts forecast depend on - Tiered rates;
and rates for sales kWh sold vary by utility
rate inflation, * Under ARP, and take
structur productivity rates are seasonal
adjusted demand into
e annually for account
inflation,
productivity
- Annual true- - Cost - ARP allows * True-ups - True-ups for
ups to Recovery for annual for revenue and
review Clauses review of stranded cost
recovery of provide rates costs discrepancies
stranded annual - Distributio
Review costs review for n Cost
s of through utility costs Recovery
remune transition - Cost Factor
ration charge Recovery proceeding
outside - Annual true- Clauses s for capex
rate ups also increasingly
cases include being used
review of for capital
costs and expenditure
rates (large
capex is not
mentioned)
Quality
standards
apply;
penalties and
rewards
- Quality
standards
apply;
penalties
only
Quality
standards
apply;
penalties
only
- Quality
standards
apply;
penalties
only
- Quality
standards
apply;
penalties and
rewards
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Maine Texas California
Quality
of
service
Table 1. (continued)
Massachusetts Florida Maine Texas California
Decoupled. Studying - Experimente Efficiency Decoupled.
Requires decoupling. d with performanc Tiered rates.
utilities to 2008 report revenue cap e Efficiency
Energy file to in 1990s. No incentives. performance
efficien decoupled legislature. decoupling incentives.
cy and rate plans, now.
conserv mostly by
ation 2012.
Efficiency
performance
incentives.
Sources: Commonwealth of Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (2007), Executive
Office of Housing and Economic Development and Executive Office of Energy and
Environmental Affairs (2011), U.S. Energy Information Administration (2010), Florida Public
Service Commission (2008), Maine Public Utilities Commission; Office of Energy Independence
and Security (OEIS); Office of the Public Advocate (OPA) (2008), Maine Public Utilities
Commission (2009, 2010), Window on State Government (2012), Public Utility Commission of
Texas (2005, 2006, 2011), California Public Utilities Commission (2009, 2010, 2012), Edison
Electric Institute (2005), Institute for Electric Efficiency (2010).
The unbundling process that occurred in Europe to open electricity retailing and
generation to competition resembles the deregulation process in the US in some ways, but differs
in some other important respects. The electric power sector in many US states underwent
restructuring and liberalization (also called deregulation) in the 1990s.2 As part of deregulation,
electricity generation was separated from the transmission and distribution grid businesses to
allow competition in generation. In some places like Texas, retail electricity supply was also
separated to permit competition in retailing. However, in other places, retail and distribution
continue to be integrated or 'bundled' together in the same business.
Deregulating parts of the electric power sector permitted the relevant electricity prices to
be determined by the market. Where deregulation occurred, the distribution "wires" business,
involving the installation and operation of the wires that transmit electricity, remained a
regulated natural monopoly. In the discussion that follows for five US states, the status of
2 An overview of the history of the US power sector is available in Holland and Neufeld (2009). The US Energy
Information Administration's latest data on electricity restructuring is available at:
http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/restructuring/restructure elect.html although as of April 2012, the most
recent data was dated September 2010.
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electric power sector deregulation is noted. Many formerly integrated US electric utilities were
also allowed to recover stranded costs for their generation assets when these were separated from
the distribution wires business during deregulation. Stranded cost recovery compensates the
company by an amount meant to be equal to the company's loss of income due to deregulation.
Because stranded costs principally relate to generation assets and not the distribution wires
business, they are not discussed further here. Deregulation was halted in many areas following
the California electricity crisis of the 1990s, when only partial deregulation combined with
manipulation of the energy markets led to price spikes in the wholesale market and to some
electricity companies declaring bankruptcy.
In Massachusetts, a deregulated state with retail choice as of 2010, pure cost of service
regulation administered by the Department of Public Utilities coexists with a different method
called Performance Based Rates (PBR). Under PBR, rates are determined by a cost of service
procedure but then adjusted for productivity, inflation, etc. PBR thus resembles incentive
regulatory schemes that adjust the price or revenue cap for inflation. Additional quality standards
apply to the electricity and gas industries in Massachusetts. In addition, electric utilities recover
their stranded costs via an annual "true-up" proceeding with the Department. (Commonwealth of
Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities 2007).
In Florida, a regulated state with no retail choice as of 2010, cost of service regulation is
applied to determine each utility's allowed revenue. In addition to the base rates utilities are
allowed to charge to recover allowed revenue, "Cost Recovery Clauses" allow each utility to
have additional expenses reviewed and recovered on an annual basis.3 A 2008 report by the
Florida PSC found that 53-69% of utilities' costs are recovered via Cost Recovery Clauses. It
was also found that capital expenses are increasingly being recovered through Cost Recovery
Clauses instead of base rates, even though Cost Recovery Clauses were originally intended to
allow recovery of more frequently fluctuating expenses (Florida Public Service Commission
2008).
3 "Cost Recovery Clauses" are used along with base rates in Florida to provide utilities with cost recovery for
expenses. The base rates are determined during the rate case, while Cost Recovery Clauses (in theory) allow for an
annual review of utility expenses to allow recovery of, "fuel costs, purchased power costs, costs associated with
encouraging energy conservation, costs of complying with governmentally mandated environmental programs and
standards, and costs of new nuclear power plants" (Florida Public Service Commission 2008, 3). However, as
discussed in the text, they have been used to recover other types of costs as well. As such, their scope is greater than
a stranded cost true-up proceeding.
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In Maine, a deregulated state with retail choice as of 2010, distribution rates are regulated
by the Public Utilities Commission. Two major electricity companies experimented with an
Alternative Rate Plan (ARP) beginning in 2000. The ARP, under which rates charged are
determined based on inflation and previous rates, represents a shift away from cost of service to
incentive regulation of prices. The Central Maine Power Company requested a new ARP to
begin in 2008, but the Bangor Hydro Electric Company did not propose that theirs be continued
after expiration in 2007 (Maine Public Utilities Commission 2010, Maine Public Utilities
Commission 2008).
In Texas, a deregulated state with retail choice as of 2010, distribution utilities continue
to have their rates regulated under cost of service regulation. Both true-up proceedings and
Distribution Cost Recovery Factor (DCRF) proceedings are allowed for under Texas law. A true-
up proceeding allows utilities to recover stranded costs, whereas a DCRF proceeding allows
utilities to file once per year to recover capital expenses on distribution systems outside of a
normal ratemaking (Public Utility Commission of Texas 2005, 2011, 2006).
In California, where deregulation and retail competition were suspended as of 2010,
distribution rates are regulated by the Public Utilities Commission under cost of service
regulation (California Public Utilities Commission 2012). However, the PUC defines a baseline
electricity allowance (kWh/day) and then defines several tiered rates for usage above the
baseline for each distribution company (California Public Utilities Commission 2009). The
higher rate tiers are applied to the corresponding amounts of electricity used above the baseline,
which encourages energy saving by customers. For example, PG&E charges the Tier 1 price for
usage up to the baseline, but then is permitted to charge the Tier 2 price for usage from 101%-
130% of the baseline, and the Tier 3 price for usage from 131%-200% of the baseline (California
Public Utilities Commission 2010).
1.2.5 Developing Incentive Regulation
As the worldwide electric industry developed, observers began to question the efficiency
of vertically integrated monopoly distribution companies. It was thought that competition, which
might lead to improved efficiency, could be introduced into some parts of the sector 4. Beginning
in the 1980s, some countries - notably the UK (1990) and Chile (1981) - began to explore
4 Newbery (1999) provides additional background on the introduction of competition to formerly vertically
integrated sectors, including electricity.
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electric power sector reform. The academic - and first President of the British Energy
Regulatory Commission - Stephen Littlechild was responsible for key ideas that drove the
regulatory reforms in electricity networks that began in the UK in 1990 (Vogelsang 2002).
The UK reforms permitted private companies to compete in the generation of electricity,
and the retail of electricity to end customers. In some ways these reforms were the precursor to
deregulation in the US. Through the 1990s, the UK reforms were adopted throughout other
European Union member states. Littlechild, who became the UK electricity regulator, developed
incentive regulation to regulate the network businesses that emerged from the reforms. Incentive
regulation was initially used in telecommunications and then in the electric power sector
following privatization. Incentive regulation operates by capping prices or revenues and
providing incentives to companies to operate more efficiently, reduce costs or make other service
improvements. In the UK after privatization, the initial goal of incentive regulation was to
maximize the cost efficiency of the new distribution companies. The following discussion treats
incentive regulation in detail, with particular focus on the experience in the UK. In the US, the
similar process of deregulation was intended to transition electricity generation and retail sectors
from monopoly to competition. However, in the wake of the California electricity crisis of 2001,
some of these reforms were rolled back or placed on hold.
1.3 Incentive regulation
Incentive regulation is also an umbrella term referring to regulatory schemes that
incentivize regulated firms to operate in socially efficient ways. Examples of incentive regulation
include price cap regulatory schemes, revenue cap regulatory schemes, and yardstick regulatory
schemes. Both price cap and revenue cap schemes are often known as "RPI-X" schemes, after
the first price cap scheme introduced in the UK in 1990.
1.3.1 Price and Revenue Caps - RPI-X
RPI-X is the name given to the incentive regulation scheme developed in the UK by the
academic Professor Stephen Littlechild (Helm 2003). Under RPI-X, each regulated company's
revenues or prices are capped for a regulatory period and indexed to a measure of economic
inflation (in the UK, the Retail Prices Index, or RPI) to recognize the impact of inflation on real
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revenues, less an adjustment factor X. Following Joskow (2006, 20) a basic RPI-X equation can
be given as:
Pt = Pt-I(1+RPI-X)
If revenue and not price is capped, the equation is rewritten:
TAR = TARt-i(1+RPI-X)
The regulator chooses whether to cap revenues or prices. There is significant scope for
different implementations of the caps. For example, the basket of prices being capped can vary:
only the prices charged for specific metering activities could be capped, or the prices for all
distribution services could be capped. It is notable that capping electricity prices gives the firm
an incentive to increase the volume of electricity sold instead, to maximize revenues. Therefore
the firm regulated under price cap does not have any incentive to reduce energy consumption for
greater environmental sustainability. Revenue caps avoid this perverse incentive. The remainder
of this discussion assumes that RPI-X regulation refers to a revenue cap.
Under RPI-X revenue cap regulation, the regulator determines the "total allowed
revenue" (TAR) that the firm is allowed to earn to cover its costs and asset depreciation by
establishing the firm's costs and valuing the "regulated asset base" on which the company may
earn a return. Costs may be benchmarked against comparable firms to reduce information
asymmetry. The TAR is set for the next B years, where B is the length of the regulatory period,
and is then indexed to the RPI-X term. The "RPI" factor ensures inflation is taken into account,
and "minus adjustment factor X" equalizes the present value of revenues with the present value
of costs over the regulatory period B. The X factor may also be determined through
benchmarking against comparable companies. Supplementary measures may also be added to the
regulatory scheme, for example to incentivize socially desirable investments on the part of the
regulated firm such as investments to improve service quality or decrease distribution network
losses.
During the regulatory period, the allowed revenues are allowed to increase (or decrease)
as the RPI increases (or decreases), but adjusted by X so that the actual rate of change of
revenues becomes RPI-X. X is generally a positive number so that, as long as the value of RPI
does not change much and RPI remains positive and larger than X, the amount of allowed
revenue decreases (until the end of that regulatory period). As long as companies' costs are lower
than the revenue cap as adjusted by the RPI-X term, the company makes a profit. This
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demonstrates the chief advantage of the RPI-X regulatory scheme: it mitigates the incentive
firms regulated under cost of service have to overspend on total investments by rewarding cost
efficiency.
Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of how a company might behave under a
revenue cap regulatory scheme with a 6-year regulatory period. At the beginning of the
regulatory period, the regulator caps revenue at a given level and thereafter decreases the cap (as
linked to RPI-X) to encourage the company to decrease its costs as well. The company will
initially try to decrease costs as much as possible to capture the profit between the cap and its
costs. But as the next regulatory period nears, the company has less incentive to decrease its
costs because if its costs are "too" low, the regulator may decide to set the next cap even lower.
If an efficiency improvement is made towards the end of the regulatory period that reduces costs,
the company will only enjoy the cost reduction for a short time and may not even recover the
costs of implementing the improvement. Hence companies may reduce their costs less towards
the end of the regulatory period, as shown.
Total Allowed Revenue, Actual Revenue, and Profit
under a revenue cap regulatory scheme
Actual Costs Profit -M-Total Allowed Revenue (TAR)
C
C
1 2 3 Year 4 5 6
Figure 2. Demonstrating RPI-X
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As noted in the UK, which was the first country to adopt this regulatory scheme, after
some time companies may be unable to decrease costs further because they have reached an
"efficiency frontier" where no further cost efficiency improvements can be made. Ofgem's 2009
review, "Performance of the Energy Networks under RPI-X", noted that under its then existing
implementation of RPI-X, "Companies continue to have incentives to reduce costs, for example
through the adoption of new business models, but the scope for further large-scale reductions
may be limited" (2).
1.3.2 RPI-X Regulation Problems: Inefficient Investment Behavior
In the absence of any supplementary measures, pure RPI-X incentive regulation may
over-incentivize cost efficiency resulting in a lack of necessary investment in distribution
networks. Since implementing RPI-X encourages companies to reduce their costs, it has to be
utilized in conjunction with supplementary measures to ensure that investments are still made to
keep quality of service and network losses at socially optimal levels. Some frequently used
supplementary measures are targets for quality of service and losses, with penalties and rewards
for missing or achieving above the targets. Companies regulated under RPI-X may also forego
investment in R&D to reduce their costs. R&D funding pots and R&D mandates are examples of
supplementary measures that may be utilized to address this. Finally, since regulated companies
are assured of keeping savings from cost efficiencies only until the end of the price control
period, RPI-X may encourage a focus on short-term cost efficiencies. Companies will prefer
reducing operational expenditure for short-term savings to reducing capital expenditure for long-
term savings. A rolling incentive has been used in the UK to mitigate this by allowing companies
to keep their savings from capital expenditure reductions for a fixed number of years - so if the
reduction occurs close to a price control review, they may roll over the years into the next price
control period (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) 2009).
Cost allocation and recovery under incentive regulation does not give rise to the same
issues as under cost of service regulation. Since the revenue or price cannot exceed the cap set
under incentive regulation, the company has a much more limited incentive to gain revenue by
selling more electricity.
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Case study: UK electricity distribution
The following case study describes some salient features of the UK experience with RPI-
X regulation in electricity distribution, and outlines some measures applied in the UK to deal
with the aforementioned problems of incentive regulation. Many countries that privatized their
electricity sectors followed the UK's example and adopted a RPI-X method of regulation,
adapting the basic RPI-X regulatory scheme as necessary for their country. For example, in
Ireland the allowed revenue is indexed to the Harmonised Consumer Price Index (HCPI) instead
of RPI, and in the Netherlands a Q-factor is added directly to the RPI-X equation to incentivize
companies to improve their quality of supply (Commission for Energy Regulation (CER) 2010,
Energiekamer 2010).
Electricity distribution in the UK was privatized following the Electricity Act 1989. The
RPI-X regulatory scheme was applied to the resulting distribution industry, consisting of 12
Regional Electricity Companies (RECs) and 2 Scottish companies. In 2001 these 14 companies
became the 14 Distribution Network Operators (DNOs) with licenses to distribute electricity in
the UK, and provisions under the Utilities Act 2000 allowed for additional distribution licenses
to be granted to independent DNOs (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) 2009).
Since privatization, each distribution company has been regulated under RPI-X. The first
price control was applied at privatization in 1990 and has since been revised every 5 years by the
regulator, the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem). As described above, at each review
the allowed revenue and efficiency factor is set by the regulator using information available on
the companies and industry. RPI-X has so far performed well: in 2009 Ofgem noted that RPI-X
had reduced the allowed revenues in electricity distribution by 60% since privatization, that
evidence suggested a decrease in operating expenditure (i.e. an increase in operating efficiency)
over the same period, and that additional regulatory incentives for quality of service had
improved service (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) 2009).
Over the years, the UK refined RPI-X to remedy fundamental challenges faced by the
regulator, as well as address some of the scheme's inherent disadvantages. For example,
incentive regulators still face the classic problem of information asymmetry: the regulator does
not know the true capital costs of the regulated firm, so determining the socially optimal allowed
revenue is challenging. Ofgem's Information Quality Incentive (IQI), introduced in the fourth
distribution price control review in 2004, provides an incentive for firms to reveal their true costs
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to the regulator (P. L. Joskow 2006, Pollitt and Bialek 2007, Office of Gas and Electricity
Markets (Ofgem) 2004). Under this ""menu" of sliding scale mechanisms" (P. L. Joskow 2006,
25-26), an external consultant is employed to calculate the required capital expenditure for each
firm to provide Ofgem with a reference calculation against which to compare the firm's spending
plan. Firms that select a revenue amount closer to the consultant's assessment, and then
underspend (thus beating the target) are allowed to keep more of their savings as profit. Firms
that select a revenue amount higher than that estimated by the consultant and then underspend
are allowed to keep less of their savings. This incentivizes companies that can beat the target to
select a lower revenue amount to retain more savings as profit, thus keeping the efficiency
incentive, while allowing companies nearer the efficiency frontier to have higher allowed
revenues.
RPI-X's focus on cost efficiency could lead companies to cut costs at the expense of
service quality. To prevent this, quality of supply incentives were introduced to the regulatory
scheme in 2002 in addition to the existing quality regulations such as Guaranteed Standards of
Performance (GSOP) (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) 2006, 2009). Ofgem's
2009 review of RPI-X noted that industry performance on metrics such as the reported number
and duration of customer interruptions had improved by 11% and 26% since the incentive was
introduced (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) 2009, 19).
RPI-X does not provide companies with incentives to make large capital expenditures,
owing to its focus on reducing costs. In the UK this issue is particularly pertinent given the
investments that will soon be needed to upgrade the electricity grid to integrate renewable
electricity sources and meet national and EU carbon emissions targets (Department of Energy
and Climate Change (DECC) 2011). In transmission, the UK regulator made an effort to address
this issue through a very large capital expenditure allowance of £4.6 billion (a 100% increase
over the past allowance) at the most recent transmission price control review (Office of Gas and
Electricity Markets (Ofgem) 2006). More fundamental changes to the regulatory scheme for
electricity and gas are being made as a result of 2009's RPI-X@20 review and are discussed in
Chapter 2 (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) 2010).
Finally, RPI-X does not encourage investments in R&D, particularly in R&D with
uncertain returns. This encourages conservatism in distribution companies and a lack of
innovation. The UK regulator addressed this problem by adding an innovation funding incentive
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(effective from 2005) and a Low Carbon Networks fund (effective from 2010) to the RPI-X
regulation.
1.3.3 Benchmarking
Benchmarking is comparing a firm's performance on a metric (such as efficiency) against
a reference value such as the performance of other firms on that metric. It can be one of a
number of tools that regulators employ to mitigate the problem of information asymmetry when
applying incentive regulation. It can also be the basic principle driving the regulatory scheme, as
it is in yardstick regulation. In this section, benchmarking's use as a valuable input tool for
incentive regulation will be discussed. Yardstick regulation is discussed in a later section.
Many different benchmarking methods exist. Benchmarking can be divided into frontier
benchmarking (comparing a regulated firm to a 'best' firm: a firm on the 'efficiency frontier'), or
average benchmarking (comparing a regulated firm to the average of all comparable firms
(Jamasb and Pollitt 2001). Second, benchmarking methods may be econometric or have their
roots in technical engineering models.
The following discussion draws upon Jamasb and Pollitt (2001). Frontier benchmarking
methods include corrected ordinary least squares (COLS), data envelopment analysis (DEA) and
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). All three methods are detailed in Jamasb and Pollitt (2003).
Jamasb and Pollitt (2001) conduct an international survey of benchmarking methods in use and
Giannakis, Jamasb and Pollitt (2005) apply DEA to the UK electricity distribution utilities.
Average benchmarking methods include using ordinary least square (OLS) estimation for
the cost function, using the average cost of a group of firms, and using total factor productivity
(TFP) as the benchmark. Sliding scale mechanisms as applied in performance based regulation
(PBR) in the US can also be seen as a form of average benchmarking, whereby the rate of return
can vary within the dead band and the target return is determined by comparing the average
performance of firms (Jamasb and Pollitt 2001).
Finally, reference network models as used in Spain, or Network Performance Assessment
Models (NPAM) as used in Sweden, can be seen as another form of benchmarking that takes
account of the technical engineering parameters of the electric grid (Jamasb and Soderberg
2010). A more detailed description of these models as used in regulation follows.
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1.3.4 Reference Network Models (RNMs)
As their name implies, reference network models (RNMs) provide regulators with a
"reference network" (like a benchmark) against which to compare regulated firms' actual
networks. A model is not a regulatory scheme; instead, it is a way for the regulator to estimate
and compare network costs in order to apply a regulatory scheme. As Jamasb and Pollitt (2008,
1794) note in their study of Sweden's use of such models, the models can thus be considered a
form of "individual benchmarking" when a separate reference network is created for each firm.
The following is a brief description of the design and capabilities of RNMs. Several other
papers (Jamasb and Pollitt 2008, Mateo Domingo, et al. 2010) go into greater technical detail on
the models; the specific model later employed in this study is detailed in Chapter 3. The basic
reference network model, called a "greenfield" model, designs an optimal distribution network
from scratch using information on the electricity customers to be supplied by the network. The
model works with a catalogue containing technical and financial parameters for grid elements,
such as the capacity and cost of substations, transformers, low voltage (LV), medium voltage
(MV), and high voltage (HV) power lines. Given the GPS coordinates and demand profiles of
the customers and the location and capacities of the electricity supply points (transmission
substations), the model designs the lowest-cost required LV, MV, and HV networks with the
requisite substations, transformers, and other grid elements selected from the catalogue. Because
the catalogue contains cost information for the lines and grid elements, the model is able to
output the total investment cost of the "greenfield" network it has built as well as the locations
and sizes of the grid elements.
A second type of RNM is an expansion planning model, also called a "brownfield"
model. This model takes the existing network as its input and calculates the incremental network
(network expansion) required to meet electricity demand owing to new customers or new
technologies. The input data to the "brownfield" model can be a network input by the user, or
can simply be a network output by the "greenfield" model. In addition, the expansion planning
model used in this study can take as input 24-hour electricity generation or demand profiles. This
permits the modeling of distributed generation units as additional generation points that supply
electricity to the network, with their generation levels varying as appropriate through the day.
For example, a home solar panel unit could be modeled by giving it a generation profile that
generates power during the day but does not generate at night.
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In Spain, the RNM is used to calculate the costs for each distribution company so that the
regulator can establish the appropriate remuneration for each firm (Comisidn Nacional de
Energia (CNE) 2009). The regulatory scheme includes additional incentives for quality of supply
and losses and the regulatory period is four years.
In Sweden, a related type of reference network model called a Network Performance
Asset Model (NPAM) is also used to "benchmark" companies, currently on an annual ex post
basis. At the end of the year, the regulator compares the cost output by the reference model with
the revenues of the actual network and investigates firms that deviate excessively from the
reference. From 2012, the Swedish regulator will move to an ex ante review with a regulatory
period of four years, similar to Spain (Energy Markets Inspectorate 2009). The regulators hope
the change will facilitate fairer charges to customers. Also, Jamasb and Pollitt (2008, 1798) note
that the current ex post approach is likely to result in higher regulatory uncertainty than the ex
ante approach.
Following Jamasb and Pollitt (2008) and Jamasb and Soderberg (2010)'s examination of
the Swedish application of these models in regulation, the remainder of this section is a review of
the literature on general advantages and disadvantages of the use of reference models in
regulation when compared to other benchmarking methods and when compared to an RPI-X
incentive regulation applied without extensive use of such models.
According to Jamasb and Pollitt, the advantages of the modeling approach include its
contribution to regulatory stability and the ability of the model to incorporate quality of service
in its technical framework. Because the model approach benchmarks the firm against a reference
version of itself, it increases regulatory stability. Quality of service costs are included when the
model designs the reference network, allowing the regulator to assign a monetary value to
quality when calculating allowed revenue. However Jamasb and Pollitt also say that in Sweden
some of these advantages may be offset by the regulatory framework in which the model is used.
The reference network's contribution to regulatory stability could be undermined by the ex post
framework which revises revenues only at the end of the regulatory period. For firms with lower
quality of service, the annual ex post review encourages a focus on short-term performance and
discourages the large capital investments over longer time periods that might be needed to
improve quality of service (Jamasb and Pollitt 2008).
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Jamasb and Pollitt (2008) also discuss more general shortcomings of the modeling
approach. The model cannot easily reflect the complex range of options available to actual firms
or the chronological development of their networks. As a result, long-term efficiency
improvements requiring large short-term capital investments are more difficult for firms to
justify. Jamasb and Pollitt note that the ex ante RPI-X scheme together with appropriate
incentives can be more effective at stimulating long-term efficiency improvements, since in the
UK application of that scheme, only opex and not capex is benchmarked. The version of the
model discussed in Jamasb and Pollitt also cannot reflect the actual development of the network
over time5 , so it is not as effective as benchmarking against actual firms.
Another disadvantage of the model is that its approach does not encourage innovation
since it cannot automatically take technology improvements into account. Whether or not the
model is up to date depends on the regulator's ability and readiness to incorporate the technology
improvements into the model. In fact, the model may "penalise a firm that is in transition from
an older specification to a more modem and advanced design" because of its backwards-looking
approach (Jamasb and Pollitt 2008, 1798).
Despite the detailed technical network model that is constructed during the use of these
models, Jamasb and Pollitt argue that the approach does not reduce information asymmetry and
does not capture the relationships between firms in the sector. But Jamasb and Pollitt appear to
be considering the model in isolation, as the sole regulatory method. If a reference network
model were applied together with a sliding scale "menu" of contracts in the regulatory scheme
the regulator might yet encourage companies to reveal more accurate information about their
costs. (It is also unclear why it is significant to capture inter-firm relationships from a regulatory
perspective, if each firm is regulated separately and holds a local monopoly.) Finally, Jamasb
and Pollitt note that the complexity of the model may undermine regulatory transparency
(Jamasb and Pollitt 2008).
Jamasb and Soderberg study the actual cost of distribution companies in Sweden vis- A-vis
the implementation of the reference network model. They find that the cost of certain types of
utilities have increased since the model's introduction and it has had little effect on the quality of
5 However, the Spanish expansion planning or "brownfield" RNM can take an existing network as input to reflect
the actual status of the network at that point in time.
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service. As a result they recommend benchmarking methods using actual firms rather than
reference model firms (Jamasb and Soderberg 2010).
1.3.5 Sliding Scales
Sliding scales are another approach to regulation. In one form, they present regulated
firms with an automatic adjustment to prices given the actual rate of return - so prices are
decreased when the firm's rate of return rises above the target rate of return as established by the
regulator (Joskow and Schmalensee 1986, Biewald, et al. 1997). In electricity, they were applied
in this form in the US in the early 1900s.
Sliding scales have more recently been used within the broader framework of RPI-X
incentive regulation. In the fourth UK distribution price control, a sliding scale incentive
mechanism was utilized to present regulated distribution firms with a choice between lower
capital expenditure offset by a higher return and a higher capital expenditure offset by a lower
return (P. L. Joskow 2006, Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) 2004). Following
Joskow (2006), in this system a "menu of sliding scales" is presented to firms. If they opt to
target a higher capital expenditure than that estimated by the regulator to be efficient, they also
select a sliding scale menu that allows them to keep less of the profits when they outperform (by
reducing actual expenditure to below the target).
Finally, a similar "menu of sliding scales" has also been proposed as a regulatory scheme
to meet the emerging challenge of distributed generation (Bauknecht and Brunekreeft 2008).
Under this proposal the regulated firm chooses a point on the sliding scale between full cost
pass-through of the costs of integrating DG, and a price cap on the prices charged to recover the
costs of integrating DG. This allows firms with high connection costs to select full cost pass-
through and connect DG knowing their costs will be remunerated, while firms with low
connection costs may select a price cap but get to keep the difference between their low costs
and their prices as profit.
In the US, some regulatory methods such as "shared savings" apply similar principles to
sliding scales by adjusting returns based on the company's actual spending relative to its original
budget. Shared savings methods have been proposed to encourage reasonable spending by
companies. In Illinois, the utility Commonwealth Edison (ComEd) proposed a ratemaking
method that would approve projects ex ante but share savings with customers if the actual capital
investment in a proposed project turned out to be more than 5% lower than the budgeted amount
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(Commonwealth Edison Company 2010). However, this was rejected by the regulatory
commission for several reasons including concerns that ComEd might inflate the budget above
true costs while the commission, because of information asymmetry, would not know whether
this had taken place (Illinois Commerce Commission 2011). In California, risk-sharing cost
recovery methods have been approved for some new advanced metering infrastructure projects;
these share some of the costs of cost overruns between ratepayers (utilities' customers) and
utilities' shareholders (California Public Utilities Commission 2008, 2007, 2006).
1.3.6 Yardstick Regulation
Yardstick regulation was proposed by Shleifer (1985) as a more efficient alternative to
cost of service regulation. This scheme, utilizing the basic principle behind benchmarking,
compares a firm's performance to the average performance of similar firms that operate under
similar conditions. Firms that outperform the average (by reducing costs) obtain higher profits,
thus incentivizing efficiency. Jamasb and Pollitt (2000) note that yardstick competition allows
firms that are geographically separated from one another to compete. Yardstick regulation, in
conjunction with a price cap, is applied to electricity distribution in the Netherlands to determine
the yardstick objective (Energiekamer 2010). It is also applied to electricity distribution in Chile
(Jamasb and Pollitt 2001, Rudnick and Donoso 2000).
A deficiency of yardstick regulation is that it may incentivize firms to invest less so as to
appear more productive relative to their costs. This underinvestment can decrease distribution
quality of service. In the case of the Netherlands electricity distribution, this has been remedied
by adding a quality factor to the price cap regulatory scheme (Energiekamer 2010).
Other problems identified with yardstick regulation include the difficulty of adjusting for
differences between distribution firms, since no two distribution utilities can be exactly the same,
and finding distribution firms whose accounts are similar enough to compare (since an analysis
of the accounting costs is required to determine the allowed revenue) (Joskow and Schmalensee
1986, Jamasb and Pollitt 2000).
Finally, in Shleifer's original paper the need for the regulator "to be prepared to let the
firms go bankrupt if they choose inefficient cost levels" under yardstick regulation is mentioned
(1985, 323). However, it has been pointed out that electricity is a public service so it is unlikely
that distribution companies will be allowed to go bankrupt (Ajodhia, Franken and van der Lippe
n.d.).
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1.4 Challenges and Issues in Power Systems Regulation
Two regulatory problems specific to electric power systems, regulating quality of service
and losses, are described below. These problems occur in both cost of service and incentive
regulatory schemes. Lastly a discussion of decoupling, a measure to mitigate distribution
companies' disincentives to reducing the volume of energy consumption, is presented.
1.4.1 Quality of Service
Quality of service issues that arise from the technical characteristics of electricity include
both reliability (supply is continuous and free of interruptions) and power quality (the waveform
of the power is as close to a perfect sinusoid as possible, and free of damaging flickers and other
problems). More generally, quality of service may also refer to commercial customer service
issues such as time to respond to customer inquiries, but the following discussion focuses on
quality issues specific to electricity.
The need to regulate quality of service within a cost of service regulatory environment
was one of the factors behind the development of performance based regulation (PBR) in the US.
When applied to quality of service, PBR imposes a financial penalty on the regulated distribution
company for failing to meet quality of service standards, and/or gives the company a financial
reward for exceeding the standard. The penalty or reward may be effected by changing the rate
of return or through a more explicit penalty/reward incentive framework. Precise definitions of
PBR applied to quality of service vary, and there are many gradations of PBR - some formats
implement it with only penalties, and some formats include targets only without penalties or
rewards.
Incentive regulation can deter investments needed to improve reliability and insure
quality of service. In many countries where incentive regulation is applied, this is corrected by
introducing quality of service targets into the regulation, with rewards and penalties for missing
targets. For reliability, targets can be defined by utilizing indices (for example, number of
interruptions) to measure reliability. An efficient level of reliability is then set as the target by the
regulator. Distribution system reliability indices have been formally defined by the IEEE in
Standard 1366; several important indices include the System Average Interruption Duration
Index (SAIDI), and the Customer Average Interruption Duration Index (CAIDI) (IEEE Power
Engineering Society 2004).
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The amount of investment to encourage so that the efficient quality of service level is
achieved can be difficult to determine. It may not be efficient, for example, to demand perfect
power quality if this can only be achieved by extremely costly investments in voltage regulation
equipment and other control systems. Customers may not even be willing to pay for such
expenses. Figure 3 illustrates this tradeoff between cost and quality.
Reference Network Models (RNMs) may be used to determine the costs required to
achieve a certain level of quality of service. The RNM takes different target numbers for service
quality metrics (SAIDI, etc.) as input parameters, and outputs the cost of the network
investments required to achieve those targets. The output data enables the construction of the
investment costs function (ICF) in Figure 3 and the calculation of the slope of the tangent that
intersects the optimum quality level. Thus, RNMs can assist regulators in determining the right
service quality targets to set and the corresponding amount of revenue to allow the company so
that it has sufficient funds to achieve those targets.
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Figure 3. "Socio-economic cost of maintaining network quality levels".
Source: Rivier and G6mez (2000, 471).
1.4.2 Losses
When power is transmitted over distribution lines, some energy is lost in the distribution
network owing to the resistance of the conductors and losses in other network equipment such as
transformers. Under incentive regulation, a penalty and/or reward scheme may be applied to
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reduce losses and encourage investment in losses reduction technologies. It can be more difficult
to set targets for losses than for quality of service, since metrics to measure losses are relatively
less standardized compared to the equivalent metrics (e.g. SAIDI) for quality of service. In the
UK, where a penalty and reward scheme with targets is in use for distribution losses, the
regulator observed the differences in measurements among companies and decided to require a
common method for reporting losses in the 2010 price control (Office of Gas and Electricity
Markets (Ofgem) 2009). On top of the basic reward/penalty scheme, a E16m funding pot was
also made available to UK distribution companies to reduce losses in 2010 (Office of Gas and
Electricity Markets (Ofgem) 2009).
New technologies such as distribution automation and distributed generation can add to
as well as mitigate line losses. Chapter 2 discusses the impact of various new technologies on
losses and the regulatory challenges they pose for losses regulation.
As with quality of service, there is a tradeoff between the cost and benefits of losses
mitigation. RNMs can also be used to calculate the cost of losses under different network and
technology scenarios. Hence RNMs may assist regulators with the calculation of appropriate
losses targets and of allowed remuneration for companies to mitigate losses.
1.4.3 Decoupling
The principle of decoupling is that it removes inefficient linkages between revenues
collected and the amount of electricity distributed by a distribution company, by making
revenues largely independent of the volume of electricity distributed. Decoupling can help
resolve issues posed by the timing of the introduction of new technologies or energy
conservation measures to the network, and by artificial linkages between the calculation of
remuneration and the cost recovery process.
If the revenues collected by a distribution company depend on the kWh of electricity used
by its customers, as they often do in the US when volumetric remuneration principles are used,
companies prefer to distribute more electricity so as to collect more revenue. But energy
efficiency programs and energy conservation measures can reduce electricity demand. If such
programs and technologies quickly penetrate the network, the kWh of electricity distributed can
quickly decrease and reduce the revenues collected by the company. However, fixed network
costs decrease less quickly than demand (if at all). If revenues fall too quickly, the distribution
company may not recover a sufficient amount of money to continue operating the network.
38
Under cost of service regulation, it may also face a lengthy and expensive rate case proceeding to
raise rates to recover the necessary revenues. Owing to this problem, distribution companies are
disinclined to integrate technologies and programs such as energy conservation measures that
could be socially beneficial.
Decoupling mitigates this problem by ensuring recovery of the total allowed revenue by
making revenue collected independent of energy consumption; several decoupling mechanisms
are described later. Decoupling has been applied to some US distribution companies to mitigate
their disincentives to energy efficiency programs. That said, decoupling is not currently applied
in all US states and even when it is applied, it can differ in implementation between states (MIT
2011, 192).
Another problem that can be mitigated by decoupling is the artificial linkage between
allowed remuneration and cost recovery. Cost of service regulators in the US often utilize
volumetric rates to recover money from customers to pay distribution companies for fixed
distribution network costs. When a higher volume (amount) of electricity is distributed,
companies may recover more than their efficient amount of revenue; when a lower amount of
electricity is distributed, companies may not recover enough money (assuming rates do not
change to account for the change in volume of electricity distributed; rates can generally only be
changed through a rate case proceeding and they do not occur very often). So the linkage that
volumetric rates create between electricity distributed, cost recovery and remuneration is not
conducive to ensuring adequate remuneration for the distribution company. Decoupling removes
unwanted linkages between remuneration and cost recovery and can help ensure adequate
remuneration for the company.
Decoupling can be implemented in a variety of ways. The US Environmental Protection
Agency's "Regulatory Incentives for Energy Efficiency" describes one method that "caps" the
total revenue (determined during the rate case), and another method that "caps" the total revenue
per customer. Under the first method, in the first year the revenue collected by the company
above (or below) the cap is placed in a balancing account for the next year. The price charged
per kWh in the next year is modified as needed to allow the company to recover the total allowed
revenue less the amount it already has in the balancing account. Thus, the company is assured of
recovering the total allowed revenue. But it is important to remember that the total allowed
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revenue itself is fixed by the rate case and decoupling does not change its value (Environmental
Protection Agency 2007).
Incentive regulation applied as a RPI-X revenue cap intrinsically achieves the goals of
decoupling under ideal circumstances. Under price cap regulation, the company cannot change
prices and would want to increase volume sold to increase revenues. But under RPI-X revenue
cap regulation, the future network costs are projected for the regulatory period and the cap set to
take account of those costs. If actual costs end up perfectly matching projected costs, the cap
allows sufficient revenue and the company does not have an incentive to increase sales volume
to cover its costs.
In the presence of new technologies, however, cost of service regulation with decoupling
remains further away from ideal regulation than an ideal RPI-X revenue cap regulation because
of the way allowed revenue is calculated. The allowed revenue continues to be determined
through the rate case, and decoupling only targets recovery of the total allowed revenue without
changing the sum allowed as the penetration of new technologies increases. To raise allowed
revenue to integrate new technologies, the company has to keep bringing rate cases, which is
time-consuming and costly and does not always ensure full cost recovery. Under an ideal
implementation of RPI-X revenue cap regulation, the total allowed revenues are projected for
several years into the future using a lengthy review process that takes into account forecasts of
factors driving future network costs (such as demand growth, distributed generation penetration,
etc.). The total sum allowed is also fully reviewed at pre-fixed regular intervals (at each price
control review) without relying on a party's bringing a rate case. Finally, an idealized application
of RPI-X can even permit the total allowed revenue to vary automatically if the actual values of
distribution cost drivers differ from the forecasts as shown below:
TARt = TARti.(1G+RPI-X).(1+Zi a .ADF i )
where TAR is the total allowed revenue, RPI-X is the price index less the adjustment factor, a is
the effect of a driving factor i on network costs and ADF is the change in the driving factor (cost
driver) with respect to the forecast value utilized by the regulator. For example, the total allowed
revenue in a given year t will increase as scaled by (I+Zi a, .ADFi) if a driving factor, such as
demand, grows slightly more than forecast so that ADF is small and positive; the increase in
total allowed revenue will be proportional to the effect of a change in demand on network costs
(indicated by the value of a).
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1.5 The Future of Distribution Regulation
In sum, some important conventional objectives of the distribution grid regulatory system
have been to ensure the distribution grid company is remunerated adequately, makes the
necessary distribution grid investments to provide a reasonable level of quality of service, and
that its costs are fairly allocated among and recovered from network users. Major regulatory
changes in the early 1990s led to the development of incentive regulation that targeted
improvements in distribution companies' cost efficiency. While challenged by classic problems
such as information asymmetry between the regulator and regulated companies and the difficulty
of regulating losses and quality of service, both these conventional regulatory schemes have
generally functioned.
Recent years have seen a greater public, political, and regulatory awareness of electricity
distribution networks' social, environmental, and economic impacts as well as the need to
modernize the networks. This awareness has led to a push for specific social, environmental, and
economic objectives to be met by distribution networks. In some cases, these objectives are
different or wholly new compared to the objectives of conventional regulation. The use of
appropriate regulatory tools can help meet such goals.
One objective is environmental sustainability. Distribution networks are increasingly
capable of accommodating renewable generation from less polluting sources such as wind and
solar generators, and they should do so as far as possible to improve environmental
sustainability. Distribution networks should minimize wastage (for example, owing to line losses
in distribution) so as to reduce the production of pollutants from electricity generation. Enabling
the large-scale distribution grid connection of electric vehicles can indirectly reduce fuel
consumption and air pollution.
Another objective is modernization for greater economic and operational efficiency.
Improved power flow management systems can defer necessary investments in network capacity.
Improved network control systems can minimize power outages and losses, improving
reliability. Networks that are capable of incorporating demand response programs allow
customers to modify their power demand on the fly and can also defer necessary capacity
investments while saving customers money.
Many new technologies such as distributed generation, electric vehicles, and advanced
metering infrastructure will connect to the distribution grid to meet these objectives. Integrating
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these technologies will necessitate changes to the way the distribution grid is operated and
maintained. Large capital investments in both distribution grids and the technologies themselves
will be needed to ensure the technologies are installed and operated effectively to realize the
economic and environmental benefits they promise. Distribution regulation schemes will need to
evolve appropriately to support the required investments. New, more sophisticated incentives
may be needed to remove disincentives to modernization and environmental sustainability that
exist in current regulatory systems, and to ensure that new technologies are used optimally.
These new technologies and the regulatory issues they raise are the subject of the following
chapter.
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Chapter 2: New Technologies and New
Regulations
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2.1 Regulating the Modernizing Grid
With the increasing penetration of technologies such as distributed generation and
electric vehicles has come a sense that existing regulatory systems are not adequate to modernize
the electric grid infrastructure to support these new technologies. The vast capital investment
needed to upgrade the infrastructure is poorly matched to the incentive regulation systems in
many countries, which encourage cost efficiency. The cost of service regulation used in many
states of the US, on the other hand, can approve or deny grid modernization projects in each
state, resulting in the lack of a coherent national grid modernization program - while still
permitting cost inefficiencies in individual projects. The first part of this chapter discusses some
of the new technologies coming into use and the inadequacies of existing regulatory systems in
terms of supporting the introduction and optimal operation of these new technologies.
Much regulatory research has focused on Europe, where the European Union target for
20% of energy consumed to be sourced from renewable sources by 2020 provides a political
stimulus for the uptake of renewable distributed generation (European Commission 2010).
Academic researchers and economists have made suggestions for the enhancement of existing
incentive regulatory schemes to meet the challenges posed by distributed generation in
distribution networks (Frias, G6mez and Rivier 2008, Scheepers, et al. 2007, Bauknecht and
Brunekreeft 2008). Recently, too, regulatory commissions such as the UK's Ofgem and the
Netherlands' Energiekamer have conducted reviews to assess the adequacy of existing
distribution network regulation and develop novel regulatory ideas to meet the challenges posed
by new technologies generally (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) 2010, Office of
Energy and Transport Regulation - the Netherlands Competition Authority 2010). Hence, the
second part of this chapter discusses some of the regulatory scheme reforms that have been
proposed or are in use to meet the challenges of new technologies, and examines specific
regulatory incentives targeting distributed generation and innovation.
2.2 Distribution Grid Challenges Posed by New Technologies
The electric grid in many countries is undergoing a process of modernization. The
increasing uptake of renewable energy sources, the proliferation of new sources of electricity
demand such as electric vehicles, and the changes in consumption behaviors enabled by
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technologies like advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) all pose challenges to the existing
electric grid system and the regulation under which it operates.
The distribution grid system is of particular importance because many of the changes
brought about by grid modernization will have their initial impact felt by the distribution system.
Already, as of March 9, 2012 the reported distribution system-related capital investments using
the US' Smart Grid Investment Grants program total more than US$3.5 billion. The breakdown
of investments is displayed in Table 2.
Table 2. Estimated spending on distribution network modernization projects under US
Smart Grid Investment Grant funding.
Amount as of
Category March 9, 2012
(US$)
AMI Expenditures 2,356,484,978.00
Customer System Asset Expenditures 339,506,879.00
Distribution Asset Expenditures:
Electric Distribution Automation Assets 878,807,644.00
Electric Distribution Distributed Energy Resource (DER) Assets 6,893,972.00
Total 3,581,693,473.00
Source: Compiled from information available at SmartGrid.gov: Program Asset
Investments (U.S. Department of Energy n.d.)
As Table 2 shows, the new technologies and control systems necessitate large capital
investments. But grid modernization will also necessitate investments in power system
components such as wires and transformers for the distribution network itself, as well as
investments in components like voltage regulators to better operate the distribution network.
Deriving maximum benefit from grid modernization will often also require a rethinking of
utilities' approach to network investment and a movement away from the 'fit and forget'
philosophy of building a network by sizing it for maximum capacity.
As described in Chapter 1, distribution companies are regulated monopolies who are
remunerated for capital investments by the regulator according to cost of service or incentive
regulation principles. However, the existing regulatory schemes are ill prepared to serve the grid
modernization process. Three main reasons exist for this: First, the existing schemes are not well
suited to providing adequate remuneration for the large capital investments needed to modernize
the grid since many of the new technologies being installed differ in important respects to
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traditional distribution grid investments, affecting company investment decisions (in both the
technologies and the distribution networks they are connected to) and regulatory approval
processes. Second, the use of these new technologies can add to the costs of distribution grid
operation in ways that existing regulatory schemes do not fully recognize and so do not
adequately remunerate for. Third, some methods in use for the allocation and recovery of
allowed costs - particularly costs related to new technologies - are inadequate and if continued,
may eventually cause the system's operational and economic efficiency to deteriorate.
The remainder of this section discusses the ways in which four new technologies pose
particular challenges for distribution grid regulation: distributed generation (DG), electric
vehicles (EV), advanced metering infrastructure (AMI), and distribution automation.
DG is one new technology that may stress the distribution grid. Definitions of DG vary. It
can refer to small-scale generation installations located at the homes of existing residential
customers of the distribution grid (i.e. coincident with system load) (Pepermans, et al. 2005). But
DG can also be located far away from customer residences, in the form of larger wind or solar
farms. Regardless of location, the wide-scale installation of DG systems introduces a significant
new energy resource into the electric grid. DG may also be defined by its level of connection to
the electricity network; for example the EU Directive 2009/72/EC defines DG as generation
installations connected to the distribution grid (rather than the higher-voltage transmission grid,
where larger installations such as wind farms may be connected) (European Parliament and
Council of the European Union 2009). Technologies used in residential DG installations may
include micro-combined heat and power (CHP), rooftop solar panels (photovoltaic panels), and
micro wind turbines. Micro-CHP, also known as cogeneration, refers to a variety of small-scale
generating technologies that generate electricity and heat simultaneously.
DG implies both benefits and costs for the distribution network and issues for regulators.
For example, DG may benefit distribution companies by providing electricity from a source
closer to residential customers than conventional generators, thus reducing upstream losses in the
network. But because distribution companies incur costs to connect each new DG unit to their
networks and manage the power flowing from these new power generation sources, regulators
must devise fair remuneration for the companies and recover the costs from customers and
generators. When DG penetration is very high, the total power generated by DG may exceed the
total system demand for power. Then the distribution company has to manage power flows from
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different, perhaps widely dispersed sources. This will necessitate changes to operational
processes and perhaps additional investments to manage power flows. Again, appropriate
remuneration schemes must be devised or the company may not make the necessary changes or
investments at all. Variable distributed generation resources such as wind and solar generators
can pose technical challenges at the distribution level because it is difficult to predict when they
will generate and feed energy into the grid. Irregular but significant power contributions by wind
and solar installations can result in voltage or frequency irregularities in the distribution grid
system that are challenging for companies to manage (Barker and de Mello 2000, Lo Schiavo, et
al. 2011).
A second new technology that could also pose a challenge for the distribution system in
the long run is electric vehicles. Large-scale penetration of electric vehicles effectively connects
many more loads to local distribution networks, which may struggle to cope with the added
capacity. A wide variety of vehicle charging times may also raise system balancing and quality
of service issues. In addition, a variety of charging systems for electric vehicles are developing.
The fastest of these (Level III charging) charges vehicles at relatively high currents in order to
reduce their charging time. Multiple vehicles consuming such high currents could place added
stress on the distribution grid. In the long run, it may become socially efficient to invest in
systems to enable the resale of electricity from car batteries to the grid, or systems to use car
batteries as an electricity storage buffer to mitigate variability caused by variable renewable
energy technologies. An appropriate system of remuneration to allow investments in these new
technologies will become necessary.
A third new technology is advanced metering infrastructure (AMI). The integration of
AMI into the distribution grid poses a challenge to distribution system regulation because it
enables potentially significant changes in electric power usage behavior. AMI enables the
operation of customer demand response programs, which shift end-user electricity demand based
on price signals or load signals from the utility in order to reduce strain on the network.
Advanced meters are able to transmit these price signals and control signals from the utility to
homes, causing appropriate shifting actions when the system is operating near peak capacity. On
the one hand, these systems could reduce the need for investing in additional distribution
network capacity. In this sense AMI represents a significant opportunity to reduce network
investment costs while developing a more sustainable energy system. On the other hand,
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distribution companies must invest not only in the meters but also the associated control systems
and new operational processes that enable demand response programs to be effective. The
current regulatory system may not be well prepared to accommodate and appropriately
remunerate these non-traditional investments from utilities.
Finally, a fourth technology area is control systems to better manage power flows in the
distribution grid. Technical advances in IT infrastructure and control systems are resulting in
improved distribution automation systems that can improve visibility and control over power
flows and power quality. One example of such a Distribution Management System was being
installed in 2011 by Avista Corp. in Spokane, WA using funds from the US$4.3 billion Smart
Grid Investment Grant program introduced in the US in 2008 (U.S. Department of Energy 2011).
2.3 Regulatory Challenges Posed by New Technologies
Four aspects of current regulatory systems that may make them inadequate to support the
installation and operation of new technologies are discussed here. These aspects are the
regulation of lost revenue, capital investment (in the new technologies and in the distribution
system itself), system performance, and innovation.
2.3.1 Regulating Lost Revenue
One problem posed by the current regulatory system, especially in the US is the
widespread use of volumetric remuneration methods which allow distribution companies to
recover costs by charging rates based on the volume of energy they distribute. In the long run,
these methods can discourage companies from supporting low-carbon technologies or energy
efficiency measures that would reduce the volume of energy distributed and raise the possibility
of not recovering enough revenue for the companies. When coupled with a lack of regulatory
incentives for connecting low-carbon technologies to the distribution grid, this issue can prevent
those technologies from being integrated with the grid at all.
In the US, several methods, notably decoupling the volume of energy sold from
remuneration, are in use to tackle this issue. Incentive regulatory schemes, often used in Europe,
are designed so that allowed revenues do not depend on energy distributed but on the projected
investment cases brought at the price control review.
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2.3.2 Regulating Capital Investment in Networks to Accommodate New Technologies
The new technologies discussed above can significantly alter the network investment
planning of distribution companies. Without new technologies, companies make regular
investments to accommodate the natural power demand growth due to existing customers in the
network. They also make investments to expand their network to serve new residential customers
(for example, when a new residential development is built).
The introduction of new technologies changes the scenarios under which network
investment planning occurs. Now, lines may have to be upgraded to accommodate additional
power flows owing to the charging demands of electric vehicles. New network components may
be required to accommodate the contributions that distributed generators make to the network
from many dispersed locations, some far away from conventional generators. Other components
may be required not for capacity but to ensure network reliability and continuity of supply given
the variability and imperfect predictability of distributed generators' power contributions and
electric vehicles' power demand. The same variability and imperfect predictability surrounding
the numbers and locations of new technologies in the network can make it difficult to formulate
appropriate network investment plans.
The Reference Network Models (RNMs) introduced in Chapter 1 can be utilized to
estimate network investment costs under different scenarios for new technologies. In Chapter 3,
two types of RNM are used to estimate network investment costs and losses costs under various
technology penetration scenarios and technology management scenarios.
2.3.3 Regulating Capital Investment in New Technologies
The new technologies discussed above generally involve the introduction of new, digital
control systems and digital devices to the power system. The challenges faced by regulators
evaluating capital investments in projects to install and integrate these new technologies arise
from several features of these technologies: their high risk of obsolescence and the shorter useful
lives of digital technologies compared to conventional network investments, the difficulty of
estimating benefits that are dependent on external factors such as evolutions in customer
behavior or increased system reliability, the difficulty of quantifying certain types of benefits
such as pollution mitigation, and the difficulty of determining cost and risk allocation given these
uncertainties. These challenges could prevent companies from proposing (under cost of service
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regulation) or undertaking capital investment (under incentive regulation) in grid modernization
projects.
Both incentive and cost of service regulation cause risk aversion in relation to capital
investments in new technologies. The current RPI-X incentive regulation scheme in the UK is
found by Ofgem to encourage a focus on "tried and tested infrastructure solutions", much as cost
of service regulators are inclined to approve proven technologies or projects (Office of Gas and
Electricity Markets (Ofgem) 2010, 8). Under incentive regulation, the focus on driving down
costs can deter companies from undertaking large capital investments even when they are
necessary to modernize the grid. In this case, the regulatory system itself is a problem, rather
than the new technologies stressing the regulatory system. This risk aversion can be exacerbated
if there is an ex post element to the regulatory scheme. For example, if companies' costs are
reviewed at the end of the regulatory period (as it was in Sweden before a recent change),
companies do not know if they will be allowed cost recovery at the time they have to make
investment decisions, which could make them reluctant to invest.
Experiences to date with grid modernization projects in the US suggests that cost of
service regulation can result in at least two points of regulatory uncertainty that may make
companies reluctant to file for new, high-capex projects in the first place. One is the inherent
risk: the possibility that the regulator may deny any project proposed, as the Maryland Public
Utilities Commission (PUC) initially denied Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (BGE)'s
proposal for an AMI project (Public Service Commission of Maryland 2010). The other arises
from the ex post nature of regulation: the regulator may deny full cost recovery after the project
has been approved. The Colorado PUC reduced Xcel Energy's cost recovery for its smart grid
city demonstration project in Boulder, Colorado from $44.5 million to $27.9 million6 (Colorado
Public Utilities Commission 2011).
The risk aversion of cost of service regulators is also a problem that may hinder achieving
the full benefits from grid modernization. The Maryland PUC rejected BGE's original AMI
proposal and, among other things, required BGE to make Time-of-Use pricing non-mandatory
before its proposal could be approved. Time-of-Use pricing is one means by which a form of
customer demand response might have been achieved through the use of the AMI system. By
6 As of April 2012, the Colorado PUC is considering an application by Xcel to recover the remainder of its costs
(Colorado Public Utilities Commission 2012).
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mitigating the Time-of-Use pricing feature of BGE's proposal, the Maryland PUC may have
reduced the potential benefits from the AMI systems being installed. In its approval, the PUC
states that the AMI investments proposed are "a large, but classic, investment in BGE's
distribution infrastructure" - and indeed, they are relatively "classic" without Time-of-Use
pricing since without that, AMI systems are little more than basic meter upgrades. (Public
Service Commission of Maryland 2010, 29). In this sense, the Maryland PUC's choice of
regulatory instrument was appropriately classic but the full potential of the AMI investment may
not be realized.
The technology risks of BGE's AMI project were also a consideration for the Maryland
PUC. The originally proposed cost recovery methods were questioned in part because they
"ask[ed] BGE's ratepayers to take significant financial and technological risks" (Public Service
Commission of Maryland 2010, 1). In addition to the PUC's concerns regarding the proposals for
cost recovery and time of use rates, the decision states that "BGE's ratepayers should not assume
the entire risk of this significant investment in unproven and evolving technology" (35). BGE's
AMI project was approved following a refilling that changed the cost recovery method from a
surcharge to a conventional regulatory asset, removed Time-of-Use pricing, and included a
customer education plan. The PUC regarded the change in cost recovery method to be critical in
mitigating risks to customers, as the need for base rate cases would ensure scrutiny of the costs
customers are asked to pay (Public Service Commission of Maryland 2010, 47).
Regulators, particularly in the US states, differ in their treatment of new distribution grid
investments and this increases regulatory uncertainty. The Maryland PUC states that AMI
investments are "a large, but classic, investment in BGE's distribution infrastructure" whose cost
should be recovered through base rate cases rather than a surcharge or a tracker mechanism
(Public Service Commission of Maryland 2010, 29). But the Texas PUC allowed cost recovery
through a surcharge for CenterPoint Energy (Public Utility Commission of Texas 2008) and
Oncor (Public Utility Commission of Texas 2008).
Non-traditional distribution grid investments to accommodate electric vehicles and
integrate AMI can involve investing in a very diverse array of new technologies ranging from
communications systems, LCD display hardware, to charging interfaces. But many of the new
technologies still carry a large risk of technology obsolescence and regulators must manage the
uncertainties associated with technology uptake, actual use, and useful life. A new technology
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may become obsolete because a competing technology is officially declared the standard. Or it
may become obsolete because it is superseded by a better version. The risks of obsolescence that
these new technologies embody do not fit well with the conservative fundamentals of
conventional regulation, which necessitate approving relatively safe investments that ratepayers
are guaranteed to see benefits from. Furthermore, the fact that new technologies have inherently
shorter asset lives compared to conventional power system technologies has ramifications for
regulatory depreciation schedules and cost recovery mechanisms that were developed for
conventional longer-lived technologies.
The difficulty of estimating benefits and costs related to capital investments in new grid
technologies is another significant regulatory issue. Critical to a cost of service regulator's
decision on whether to approve or deny a major capital investment project is the cost-benefit
analysis of the proposed project. The lack of uniformity in regulatory and utility approaches
across US states has so far resulted in a wide variety of cost and benefit estimates for advanced
metering infrastructure programs alone. MIT's Future of the Electric Grid study examined 10
advanced metering projects in 6 states whose average cost per meter installed ranged from $149
to $484 (more than three times as much as the lowest estimate), and whose operational benefits
per meter installed ranged from $50 to $232 (more than four times as much as the lowest
estimate) (MIT 2011, 135-136). Not only may regulators applying cost of service principles find
it difficult to evaluate whether or not to approve a project, because the technologies are so new
and cost-benefit comparisons are so difficult to find, but they may also approve projects that cost
too much. Or they may deny projects out of fiscal conservatism but consequently miss out on the
multifaceted benefits such technologies can bring.
Complicating the issue is the fact that some benefits due to capital investments in grid
modernization projects are inherently uncertain. Benefits may be uncertain because they are
highly dependent on external factors difficult to forecast at the time of investment decision-
making. For example, realizing the full benefits of an AMI project may depend on future
scenarios involving receptive and active customer behaviors, availability and uptake of dynamic
pricing programs, and supportive government policies. Other benefits are uncertain because they
are difficult to quantify; such benefits may include environmental benefits and pollution
mitigation.
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Furthermore, the benefits due to high capital investment now may accrue over a much
longer period than for conventional technologies, resulting in regulators having to take account
of a much longer time period than before. Certain types of projects can take many years to show
returns on investment. For example, the full benefits of AMI may not appear on balance sheets
until the meters have been installed, customers educated about using them, and appropriate smart
appliances and dynamic pricing schemes have been fully integrated. For both cost of service and
incentive regulation, the length of the return on investment poses a problem. In cost of service
regulation, the long time horizon needed before benefits are realized can deter regulators from
approving funding for smart grid projects. In revenue and price cap incentive regulation, where
the frequency of regulatory reviews depends on price control periods, shorter price control
periods deter regulated companies from investing for long term benefits because they cannot be
sure that they will recover all their investment costs over the short price control period. As noted
by the UK's Ofgem, the short price control periods under RPI-X incentive regulation encourage
companies only to focus on projects that quickly deliver cost savings or benefits in the short term
(Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) 2010).
2.3.4 Regulating Performance
Regulatory challenges may arise from the technical effects of some new technologies on
the operation and performance of the existing distribution system. For example, a large
penetration of distributed generation from variable renewable energy sources may have a
negative impact on the distribution network's quality of service, losses, or stability that can
undermine the apparent benefits of the new technology. Therefore, regulatory remuneration
schemes must take into account the costs distribution networks incur to maintain an acceptable
level of performance with the penetration of new technologies, and remunerate companies
accordingly. At the same time, regulatory schemes must acknowledge the positive contributions
some technologies can make to system performance.
The Italian regulatory authority set up demonstration projects to investigate the effect of
DG on medium voltage networks' protection relays and voltage regulation systems and noted
that operational changes will be needed to smoothly integrate DG into the system (Lo Schiavo, et
al. 2011). So grid modernization projects may necessitate additional network investments (for
example, in stabilization or protection technologies) to maintain service quality and manage
losses, increasing the cost to distribution companies. Such considerations make the cost-benefit
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analysis of modernization projects more difficult. Regulatory measures such as penalty/reward
schemes for quality of service may be needed to incentivize distribution companies to make the
necessary investments in maintaining system performance alongside their investments in new
technologies. Even at present not all US states have specific regulations targeting adequate
reliability and the regulations of those that do can vary in design across states; for example, a
2011 report by the Galvin Electricity Initiative noted that 20 states have penalties for not
providing adequate system reliability, and 5 have rewards for achieving above target reliability
(Galvin Electricity Initiative 2011). The lack of more prevalent regulation could become a
problem as new technologies with less predictable power flows, such as DG or electric vehicles
connect to the grid and make ensuring reliability harder. It could also become necessary for
regulators to change the total amount of revenue distribution companies are allowed to recover
so that they are remunerated for any higher investments needed to maintain system performance
levels.
On the other hand, some new technologies may help system performance. Distribution
automation systems provide greater visibility of the distribution network and can improve
responses to outages or service quality problems. Distributed generation located in the low
voltage network may decrease the amount of power that has to be transmitted through the higher
voltage network, and so reduce losses. But the cost efficiency incentive in incentive regulation
can prevent investments in these new technologies despite their potential benefits. Deterring
these investments will reduce the benefits seen by customers and distribution companies.
2.3.5 Innovation
Encouraging companies to undertake research and development and carry out innovative
projects, when these projects may pose uncertain returns, is another regulatory challenge. Under
cost of service regulation, where companies have to file for cost recovery for new projects,
regulators and companies alike may be reluctant to pursue the lengthy rate case review process
for innovative projects with uncertain returns, or even to approve the projects when the review is
undertaken. Under incentive regulation, where an emphasis is placed on cost efficiency,
companies may be unwilling to spend money on projects with such uncertain returns - especially
when those could reduce their profits.
Encouraging innovative projects is a particularly important issue for grid modernization.
The effective integration of many new technologies relies on distribution companies being
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willing to consider innovative approaches to the installation, management, and use of these
technologies as part of their systems. For example, the smooth integration of electric vehicle
charging requirements into the distribution network may necessitate innovative power flow
management strategies that have not previously been used. Regulation must provide companies
with the security of remuneration and the appropriate risk incentives to undertake projects that
experiment with innovative approaches to new technologies.
2.4 How can Regulation Incentivize the Uptake of New Technologies and
Support their Operation?
With regard to new technologies, the issues identified above: regulating capital
investment, regulating performance, cost recovery, and encouraging innovation may be
addressed through the regulatory scheme and through specific or targeted regulatory incentives.
2.4.1 Regulatory Schemes
Two major regulatory schemes, cost of service and incentive regulation, were described
in Chapter 1. As this chapter discusses, these schemes may be inadequate under a high take-up of
new technologies that cause the electric grid to operate in different ways and that reduce
electricity usage or change electricity usage patterns.
Regulators in some countries are considering, or have begun to undertake, wholesale
changes to their regulatory schemes to address the coming challenges described above. The
following discussion of some such changes draws upon the experiences of two countries whose
power sectors are regulated under incentive regulation: the UK and Italy. This is followed by a
discussion of the situation in the largely cost of service regulated US.
The UK
The regulatory shift underway in the UK is from an inputs-based to an outputs-based
regulatory scheme. Under both schemes, revenues are capped with the RPI-X incentive
mechanism. Inputs-based regulation intrinsically introduces a focus on regulating capital
investment (the "input" to the regulatory scheme). Thus an inputs-based regulatory framework
tends to focus on cost efficiency of distribution companies, with less attention paid to the
performance metrics of the network (except where specific incentives with penalties or rewards
are added, as they are for quality of service and losses). An outputs-based framework shifts the
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focus to measuring network "outputs", thus ensuring or at least encouraging a certain level of
performance. As planned for the UK, such a framework would focus on setting targets for
specific metrics (customer interruptions, carbon footprint) that the distribution companies would
have to meet (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) 2010). Like Ofgem, the Italian
regulator is considering moving to an outputs-based framework (Lo Schiavo, et al. 2011).
In the UK, the shift to an outputs framework is prompted by a recognition of the need to
move towards a low carbon economy by encouraging networks to invest for the long-term and be
flexible in using a variety of new technologies, while ensuring the networks' performance remain
satisfactory (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) 2010). In Italy, the shift is prompted
by a sense that outputs-based regulation will be more efficient because the regulator does not
have to select individual projects for approval, because such regulation can potentially prevent
inefficient investments, and because it will fuel network innovation (Lo Schiavo, et al. 2011, 13).
The UK regulator, Ofgem's new outputs-led framework is titled Revenue set to deliver
strong Incentives, Innovation, and Outputs (RIIO). Under RIIO, electricity (and gas)
transmission and distribution companies are set specific outputs to deliver in categories such as
"reliability and availability" and "environmental impact" (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets
(Ofgem) 2010). The underlying revenue cap is tied to RPI-X, but with a longer price control
period.
The RHO framework represents an attempt to address many of the problems discussed in
this chapter. The longer-term 8-year price control allows companies to invest in technologies
whose benefits may only be realized in the long term. The focus on outputs gives network
companies some freedom to invest in the variety of technologies on offer as long as they deliver
on the output metrics, which can help stimulate the take-up of innovative solutions. Furthermore,
the outputs system permits the regulator to introduce broader targets for the network such as
environmental targets (as part of the "environmental impact" output category), which is less easy
to do under an inputs-focused regulatory framework.
Innovation is given additional attention under RIIO. An extra pot of money called the
"innovation stimulus package" provides funding for innovative distribution grid projects. The
stimulus is funded by customers via use of system charges (Office of Gas and Electricity
Markets (Ofgem) 2010, 124). RIIO also adds to competition by allowing third party companies
to participate in projects receiving innovation funding or to provide network services. The
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regulator intends to create an "innovation licence" to enable such companies to receive the
innovation funding. Such competition could itself stimulate greater innovation in the sector.
Access to capital is an important issue given the costly capital investments that will have
to be made. Ofgem (20 10)'s final decision on the RIIO scheme notes the importance of access to
adequate financing for electricity companies to be able to make appropriate investments. The
"financeability principles" of the RIIO proposals are meant to promote regulatory clarity and
long-term thinking that will make the sector stable and attractive to investors (Office of Gas and
Electricity Markets (Ofgem) 2010, 105). Similarly, the Netherlands' Energiekamer conducted a
review of its existing regulations in 2010 which also noted that "...financing substantial
investments often requires additional equity capital. It is therefore imperative that shareholders
not only focus on receiving dividends on the short term, but that they also take into account the
network operators' future capital demand" (5-6).
In addition to changing the regulatory scheme, the UK government has mandated that all
electricity meters be upgraded to "smart" (advanced) meters as part of a national smart metering
program. (However, it is worth noting that following 2006 changes to the UK regulations,
metering is a competitive activity separate from distribution (Office of Gas and Electricity
Markets (Ofgem) 2010).) Minimum technical specifications and a roll out schedule have been
established by the government's Department of Energy and Climate Change and the regulator.
The data communications in the meter networks are to be managed centrally by a monopoly
communications company regulated by Ofgem. This top-down approach to regulation is notable
for its difference from the US' smart metering projects, which are largely confined within each
utility's service territory with little nationwide coordination.
Italy
The Italian regulator is also examining ways to modify regulation to support DG and
electric vehicles (EVs). While the overall regulatory scheme has not been changed yet, the
regulator has supported demonstration projects to examine the capacity of the Italian distribution
network to accommodate DG. Those projects, selected carefully to ensure that the more efficient
ones were allowed to progress, were regulated under an inputs-based regulatory scheme with
incentives and additional remuneration of capital investment. (However as noted above, the
paper "Changing Regulation" indicates that the regulator would like to move to outputs-based
regulation for the entire network (Lo Schiavo, et al. 2011, 8).) In the EV projects, the market for
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charging infrastructure is open to other companies as well as distribution companies; customers
recharging their vehicles may also select the retailer to buy the electricity from. The regulator
sees public electric vehicle recharging as "almost outside the boundary of the regulated
distribution business" (Lo Schiavo, et al. 2011, 11).
Innovation in electricity distribution has been tackled in Italy largely by the
demonstration projects described above. The regulator has designed schemes that fund
companies undertaking innovative projects, for example by allowing selected projects an extra
2% return on the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) for 12 years (Lo Schiavo, et al. 2011,
7).
In 2001 Italy began to install smart meters throughout the distribution network together
with a Time-of-Use dynamic pricing scheme. At the time, the regulator set minimum meter
technical requirements and the timing of deployment. However, because those meters use older
technology that does not allow real-time control or real-time electricity usage reporting, the
regulator is now dealing with the problem of technology obsolescence - meters available today
are even more sophisticated. The regulator set a useful life for the original meters of 15 years,
enabling them to be replaced and upgraded to keep them in line with technological
developments. Indeed, a reconsideration of appropriate asset lives is likely to be necessary as
part of regulatory changes to deal with new technologies.
The US
The approach of the US to implementing grid modernization contrasts notably with the
approaches taken in Italy and the UK. The US approach relies on a bottom-up, industry-driven
process aided by significant government funding. State regulators generally do not dictate the
timing or features of smart grid rollouts, but they approve the projects and regulate cost recovery.
So the focus is on inputs-based regulation through cost of service ratemaking. Although the
performance based regulation (PBR) that has been introduced in some states encourages some
focus on outputs, the present implementations of PBR are generally not directly motivated by
grid modernization and focus more on target-setting related to network quality of service
measures.
State regulators have largely regulated capital investments and projects involving new
technologies under existing regulatory frameworks - generally cost of service regulation. As
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some of the earlier examples in this chapter illustrate, state PUCs may differ in their approaches
to cost recovery even when working under similar cost of service frameworks.
It is notable that California's PUC has required its regulated utilities to file smart grid
deployment plans consisting of eight elements (a vision statement, deployment baseline, smart
grid strategy, grid security and cyber security strategy, smart grid roadmap, cost estimates,
benefits estimates, and metrics) (California Public Utilities Commission 2010, 29). With regard
to communications standards, the PUC deferred a decision on adoption of specific standards in
2010 until the US' National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) had made sufficient
progress on national standards (16). Instead the PUC's focus, as expected under cost of service
regulation, is on the cost-benefit analysis of the project and cost recovery methods. There seems
to be little scope for coordination between regulated firms; since each utility is required to have
its own smart grid deployment plan, it would be possible for each utility to implement a different
aspect of the smart grid (or use a different communications system or hardware technology) in its
service territory even though all of them are regulated by the California PUC. This contrasts with
the more coordinated top-down approach taken to smart metering projects in the UK and Italy.
The inclusion of progress metrics as a key element in the smart grid deployment plans
represents an area of overlap with the principles of measurement and reporting that underlie
outputs-led incentive regulation. Indeed, the need for and importance of metrics has been noted
in other areas of grid modernization such as cybersecurity (Government Accountability Office
2011). California's PUC recently published a set of progress metrics to measure regulated
utilities' progress towards smart grids, although it seems that specific targets are not binding
(California Public Utilities Commission 2012, 2012) whereas they are likely to be under the
UK's upcoming outputs-led regulatory scheme.
Most significant grid modernization projects in the US are currently financially supported
by the US federal government's Smart Grid Investment Grants (99 projects) or Smart Grid
Demonstration Projects initiatives (32 projects) (U.S. Department of Energy 2012). The
government funds up to 50% of the cost of projects supported under the Investment Grant or
Demonstration Project initiative. While the Demonstration Projects showcase the feasibility of
new technologies relating to the smart grid or to energy storage, the Investment Grants fund
modernization of the existing grid using feasible and relatively established new technologies in
areas ranging from advanced metering and distribution automation to electricity transmission. In
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a sense, the Investment Grants resemble the Low Carbon Networks fund used in UK electricity
distribution. US metering projects in particular are often designed and proposed by private
utilities, in contrast to the situation in the UK and Italy where the government regulates smart
metering rollouts.
Comparing Approaches: Smart Grids and Smart Meters
Table 3 compares the regulatory and grid modernization approaches taken by these
countries by focusing on their smart metering programs. But because US implementations of
smart metering vary so widely between states and distribution companies, the example program
used is the Smart Grid Deployment Plans mandated by the California regulator.
Table 3. Comparing smart metering and smart grids in Italy, the UK, and California
Area California Italy UK
(smart grids) (smart meters) (smart meters)
Deployment schedule * Determined by * Defined in 2006 * Defined by
companies regulation; over 95% government as 2019
of LV customers to
have installations by
end 2012
Meter * Determined by * Defined in 2006 * Functional
functionalities/Technical companies regulation Requirements defined
Requirements e Metering intervals by government e.g.
regulated two way
* Installation of in- communications
home display e Requirement to offer
required in-home display
" Vital service e Other areas under
mandated even consideration for
without payment; regulation include
reconnection within 1 inserting
day after payment interoperability
e Incentive to record requirement to
interruptions using suppliers' licences
smart meters
Time-of-Use Critical * No exnlicit regulatory e Regulated to e Meters must be
requirement for ToU
or other similar
pricing
introduce mandatory
ToU pricing for all
customers by end
2011
technically capable of
supporting time-of-
use tariffs, but no
explicit requirement
to implement tariff
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Peak, other advanced
pricing
Table 3. (continued)
Area California Italy UK
(smart grids) (smart meters) (smart meters)
Data communications * For smart grid * Was established using * Managed by new data
approach projects, determined Power Line Carrier communications
by companies; communications over company regulated by
Commission will LV distribution Ofgem
await national network
interoperability
standards before
adoption decision
Multi-regional * Each company's e New data
coordination service territory can communications
have different company integrates
technology all meter data
Role of regulator! * Regulate cost * Top-down; mandates e Top-down; mandates
government recovery for meters smart metering smart metering
and other investments * Regulates the data
communications
company
e Sets meter technical
specifications
Sources: Italy data from Lo Schiavo et al. (2011), Meeus et al. (2010). UK data from DECC and
Ofgem (2011), DECC (2012). California data from California PUC (2010).
It is clear that the regulatory body and governments play a much more direct role in
mandating and regulating deployments in Italy and the UK. However, the fact that private
companies drive the modernization process in California may give projects there a greater
impetus.
Conclusions from Comparative Analysis
The experiences of these countries, then, illustrate notable shifts in regulatory thinking
about incentive regulation. Their approaches to grid modernization can be summarized in three
trends. One is the focus on distribution network outputs for regulation of the distribution
companies, which implies corollary foci on the development of appropriate metrics, performance
measurements, and regulatory target setting. The second trend, which is applied selectively to
nationwide rollouts of certain new technologies like advanced meters and less often to localized
grid modernization projects, is increasingly detailed regulatory intervention including the
dictation of minimum technical specifications for specific projects. The third is regulators'
increasingly explicit focus on encouraging innovation, whether by providing grants to carry out
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innovative projects or by allowing innovative projects to earn a higher return. This implies
corollary foci on extending the length of the price/revenue control period to allow innovative
projects more time to reach fruition (in incentive regulation), and shortening asset lives to
encourage investments and (in some cases) recognize the shorter useful life of innovative new
technologies. Figure 4 depicts these trends, highlighting countries that have given especial
priority to each trend.
Regulatory
Intervention
e UK, Italy e US, UK, Italy e UK, Italy
* Develop metrics a Shorten asset
* Set targets lives
* Measure e Lengthen price
performance control
Figure 4. Trends in modem grid regulation. Countries that have prioritised a particular
trend are highlighted in bold font.
Several of these trends appear to be somewhat contradictory. For example, the desire to
encourage innovation by regulating outputs rather than inputs, leaving companies free to choose
different approaches to achieving the outputs, is at odds with dictating detailed technical
specifications (leaving companies less freedom) for projects such as AMI rollouts. This might be
understood via the need to exert more control over special cases like AMI rollouts, which are
one-off projects for the entire country (or service territory). But dictating specifications can
increase the risk of missing innovative approaches or new technologies as they emerge.
Thus far, countries like the UK and Italy have prioritized the first trend - focusing on
regulating outputs in a top-down approach. Many PUCs in the US have focused more on the
second trend, driving innovative grid modernization via a bottom-up funding approach. But all
three trends are seen to some extent in modern regulatory approaches. Whereas the US funds
projects out of funding pots, the UK and Italy may employ other funding measures like the 2%
additional return on capital for innovative projects (in Italy) or the additional revenue driver for
innovative connection projects under the Registered Power Zones scheme (in the UK).
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Out puts Innovation
It remains to be seen whether the more regulator-driven regime in the UK and Italy, as
opposed to the industry-driven process in the US, will affect the speed of AMI or smart grid
program rollouts. The Italian smart metering rollout is expected to cover more than 95% of low
voltage customers by the end of 2012 (Lo Schiavo, et al. 2011). The UK has recently set a target
of 2019 for the AMI rollout to be complete nationwide (Department for Energy and Climate
Change (DECC) 2012). The US is not dictating the timing of AMI rollouts at the national level,
but the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's 2011 update on smart metering reports AMI
penetration of 8.7% (from a 2010 survey covering the year 2009) (Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission 2011).
The preceding sections of this chapter describe several regulatory issues introduced by
new technologies, including regulating capital investment, performance, and innovation.
Outputs-based regulation can be seen as an attempt to address some of these issues. First, in
terms of regulating capital investment in the networks and in the new technologies, outputs-
based regulation under a RPI-X framework allows companies the freedom to make investment
decisions as long as the output targets are met. Alternatively some aspects of outputs-based
regulation such as metrics development and measurement may be adopted but regulatory
remuneration continue to occur under cost of service regulation; some US states may eventually
arrive at such a scenario. Then companies may propose any investment to the regulator, in theory
having freedom of choice over the investments proposed, but they will still run the risk of having
the proposal rejected and if risk averse, may choose not to make the proposal anyway. Second, in
terms of regulating performance, outputs-based regulation is similar to setting performance
targets. If coupled with the right rewards and penalties, it can be an effective method of ensuring
a reasonable level of quality of service. Third, in terms of regulating innovation, outputs-based
regulation - compared to inputs-based regulation - frees companies to implement innovative
methods of managing new technologies so that the output targets are achieved.
The regulatory reforms adopted to date - especially the focus on outputs - are signs that
regulators perceive the need for change to keep up with modern developments. It seems clear
that outputs-based regulation is the way forward in terms of leaving the field open to innovation
while achieving modern goals including environmental sustainability. In the US it could be
useful to have a more coordinated approach to this aspect of regulatory reform across states;
currently, some Public Utility Commissions such as California's are adopting a more proactive
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approach than others. That said, the varied state of electric utility restructuring in different states
and the mix of industry structures, from vertically integrated companies to retail competition,
make it difficult to adopt a one-size-fits-all regulatory approach.
2.4.2 Regulatory Incentives
Technology or issue-specific incentives are distinct from the general regulatory schemes
(such as incentive regulation schemes) that are evolving to encourage distribution grid
modernization. Incentives may be added to conventional regulatory schemes, or may be deeply
integrated into the design of a new or evolved regulatory scheme.
Incentives deserve particular attention because they can be especially useful for grid
modernization projects. Often a new grid technology, such as an advanced or "smart" meter, has
to be installed once so that it can be used for many years. Well-designed incentives can
encourage these one-off, capital-intensive improvement projects. Furthermore, connecting new
technologies, such as distributed generation, may affect distribution companies' required
network investments, distribution grid system operation, and system performance (voltage
control, power quality, etc.) (Bayod-Rijula 2009, Pepermans, et al. 2005, Frias, G6mez and
Rivier 2008). Therefore, targeted incentives often aim to modify the regulated asset base or
allowed revenue by an amount that compensates the distribution company for the targeted
technology's effect on revenue. Well-designed incentives can thus encourage appropriate
integration of the technology into regular distribution network operations.
The absence of such incentives can make companies reluctant to undertake the
connection and installation work, not to mention the operational changes necessary to
accommodate the new technologies. This is especially true for technologies where the upfront
costs of connection and integration with the distribution grid are high.
Incentives for Distributed Generation
To date, incentives to encourage the integration of specific new technologies have largely
focused on connecting, integrating, and optimizing the use of distributed generation. The
following discussion concerns incentive approaches to tackle the issues of regulating capital
expenditure (capex) and network performance in the presence of DG. The approaches that have
been discussed for DG may serve as useful case studies for other new technologies.
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The comprehensive report by the DG-GRID project of the European Commission
enumerates 5 possible incentives for distributed generation, which were subsequently further
studied in other papers and merit discussion here (Bauknecht and Brunekreeft 2008, Scheepers,
et al. 2007, Frias, G6mez and Rivier 2008). These incentives assume an RPI-X incentive
regulation scheme with a regulated asset base and a basic revenue cap formula:
TAR = TARt-i(1+RPI-X)
The incentives can be classified as extrinsic changes to the remuneration formula, or as intrinsic
changes to the regulatory process to capture the effects of DG on the network. They range from
direct modifications to the classic revenue cap formula, to changes to the benchmarking
procedure.
1. Passing through costs of DG
TARt = TARt- 1(1+RPI-X) + z%I following de Joode, et al. (2009)
This method, applied to revenue cap incentive regulation, simply passes through to
customers a certain percentage of the costs of DG. The utility is guaranteed remuneration
of z percent of the investment cost I of upgrading its network to integrate DG. This
allows for direct remuneration of investment, similar to cost of service regulation.
However, the value of z can be set to less than 100% to avoid the Averch-Johnson effect
of overinvestment in capital when full cost recovery is guaranteed. This method relies on
a certain degree of regulatory judgment as to how much of the cost to pass through to
final customers.
2. Including a quality indicator in the regulated asset base (RAB) formula to capture
DG's effects on network quality
TARI = TARt-1i(1+RPI-X+Q) following de Joode, et al. (2009)
This addresses the issue of regulating performance discussed above by focusing on DG's
effects on the distribution network; for example, the reverse power flows from DG into
the network can affect the frequency of the power system and the power quality
(Pepermans, et al. 2005). This incentive adds a Q indicator to the equation for total
allowed revenue to acknowledge that more DG connections can increase quality-related
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costs, so distribution companies accommodating more DG should receive an
appropriately incremented revenue. This method also relies on regulatory judgment to
compute an appropriate value for Q. For revenue cap applications where a Q indicator is
already included to incentivize quality of service, as in Italy, this method might
necessitate modifying the indicator to factor in the effects of DG.
3. Including one or more revenue drivers in the revenue cap formula
TARt = TARt.1i(1+RPI-X) + kykWDG + k2MWhDG following de Joode, et al. (2009)
This method allows the regulator to separately target DG connections and actual DG use
(use of or integration of DG into the network). This could be viewed as a more
sophisticated version of method 1, cost pass-through.
Although DG connections and DG use are the possible revenue drivers in this example,
other metrics might conceivably be used. Here, the first revenue driver ki increases the
DSO's revenue for each new DG connection made to the network. This can stimulate the
DSO to invest in the network as necessary to increase DG uptake. However, the driver
may also simulate investments in the network over and above the optimal level - giving
rise to the Averch-Johnson overinvestment effect. A possible advantage of a revenue
driver is that it encourages companies to decrease the cost of connection to a level below
that of the revenue driver (Scheepers, et al. 2007, 46). The calculation of the revenue
driver will then be especially important. That said, as Bauknecht and Brunekreeft (2008,
490) note, the DSO may also be incentivized to prevent any DG connecting where the
connection costs are above the amount of the revenue driver.
The second revenue driver k2 rewards the distribution company for each MWh of DG that
is used to meet network demand. This encourages the distribution company to actively
utilize the DG and may also provide it with revenue for operating costs and maintaining
performance.
4. A combination of methods (1) and (3)
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TARt = TARta(l+RPI-X) + z%I + kjMWhDG
In this method a cost pass-through is combined with one (or potentially more) revenue
drivers. This guarantees the DG some remuneration of cost while encouraging it to utilize
the connected DG.
This method has been applied to UK electricity distribution since 2005, when it was
adopted as part of the fourth distribution price control review and retained at the fifth
price control review. Under the method in use in the UK during the present (fifth) price
control, z=0.8 (80% of costs are passed through) and the revenue driver is £1.00/kW/yr
for most of the regulated firms (it was £1.50/kW/yr for most regulated firms during the
fourth price control). An additional allowance of E 1/kW/yr is given for operation and
maintenance costs. The overall returns on DG earned by the regulated firm have a cap
and floor to decrease uncertainty (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) 2004,
2009).
5. Changing the regulatory scheme: Changing the benchmarking process to allow for
DG, or allowing companies more liberty to decide the spending allocation between
OPEX and CAPEX
In addition to more direct incentives, some proposals center on taking DG into account at
an earlier stage in the regulatory process. DG can be taken as an input factor during the
benchmarking analyses that determine companies' relative efficiency. This would allow
DG performance metrics to affect the computed productivity of each firm so that when
firms are compared to each other, DG is intrinsic to the comparison and the calculation of
X (Scheepers, et al. 2007, 45). Alternatively, the regulator can retain the original method
of benchmarking companies' efficiency and adjust the results to allow for DG's impact
(Scheepers, et al. 2007, 46).
Finally, in incentive regulation, the regulator can regulate overall spending (capital
expenditure plus operational expenditure) leaving it up to the companies to decide the
division of spending between capital expenditure and operational expenditure. This can
allow companies to increase their operational expenditure to improve system
performance, which may be necessary to fully integrate DG (Scheepers, et al. 2007, 46).
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following de Joode, et al. (2009)
Bauknecht and Brunekreeft (2008, 482) also note that when capital and operational
expenditure are regulated separately and the distribution company is benchmarked against
others for operational expenditure efficiency, it may make higher capital investments to
accommodate DG instead of accommodating it through operational investments in active
management.
These methods are less specific to DG and might also incentivize investment in
operational measures to integrate other technologies such as electric vehicles. Then again,
it is unclear whether these less targeted methods would in fact improve DG integration.
Although most of the above schemes were developed with DG in mind, a number of them
could also be appropriate for other emerging technologies. For example, a modified revenue
driver (method 3) could be applied to encourage integration of electric vehicles or including
distribution automation in the regulated asset base (method 1) could encourage DSOs to invest in
distribution automation. A challenge for regulators is designing an integrated regulatory scheme
that contains incentives appropriate to each technology.
It may be possible to introduce features to the regulatory scheme that present companies
with a choice between the type of incentive. Bauknecht and Brunekreeft (2008) suggest the
application of a sliding-scale mechanism that gives companies a choice between pure cost pass-
through and full price cap. The choice encourages companies to reveal the true costs of
connecting DG, because companies for which DG is expensive to connect will choose a greater
cost pass-through whereas companies for which DG is cheap will choose a price cap.
A number of factors are likely to influence regulators' choice of incentive scheme. One is
the relative uptake of each technology in the network. For example, to encourage distribution
companies to integrate a new technology into their network it may be wise to stimulate
connections by attaching a revenue driver to the number of connections. Conversely, for a
distributed generation technology that already has many connections to the network, the revenue
driver could be attached to the MWh of electricity it contributes to the network so that the
distribution company is incentivized to ensure it maximizes the use of DG. Another factor is
political: if there is special interest in encouraging a specific technology, the incentives for it can
be made stronger. The mix of incentives can also depend on regulators' views of how DG (or
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other technologies) should be used within the network. If it is desired to encourage network
operators to use DG to offset capital investments in ancillary services such as frequency
response, an incentive remunerating operators using DG for ancillary services would be
appropriate.
Incentives for Innovation
Innovation merits a separate discussion because of the increasing attention incentives for
innovation are receiving from regulators (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) 2009).
Stimulating appropriate capital expenditure and ensuring appropriate remuneration are especially
important for innovation. Innovation can be tackled as a specific issue, for example by designing
incentives to encourage expenditure on innovative projects. Alternatively, incentives may target
innovation around specific new technologies. For example, the Registered Power Zones scheme
in the UK funds innovative distributed generation solutions by adding an innovation incentive on
top of the distributed generation incentive (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) 2004,
46).
This section discusses and categorizes a number of approaches to incentivizing
innovation. Some have been proposed and others are in use. Some are similar to the methods
studied or proposed for distributed generation. It will be important to consider whether a similar
approach can be used effectively to stimulate different aspects of grid modernization such as
distributed generation take-up and innovative projects.
Regulatory approaches to innovation can be extrinsic or intrinsic to the regulatory
scheme. Intrinsic approaches can include including innovation in the regulated asset base
(similar to method 1 for DG, above), extending the length of the regulatory period in incentive
regulation, or moving from frontier to average benchmarking during the analysis of regulated
firms' cost or performance. While this last is suggested as an effective incentive for distributed
generation by the EU's DG-GRID study, the study also mentions that "average benchmarking is
more favourable to network innovation as it is easier for DSOs to capitalize on the efficiency
gains due to their innovation investments" (Scheepers, et al. 2007, 45). Hence average
benchmarking can also be a method of indirectly stimulating investment in innovative projects.
Extrinsic approaches can include establishing a separate regulated cost base for innovation, and
mandating a certain level of innovation spending. Finally, while innovation cost recovery can be
addressed through use of system charges, establishing ex ante funding pots specifically for
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innovative projects could direct the revenue from the charges towards funding innovation. In this
way, the existence of the pot incentivizes innovation.
1. Passing through costs of innovative projects
The costs of innovative projects can be passed through to customers. The UK's
Innovation Funding Incentive (IFI) introduced during the fourth price control review for
2005-2010 mitigates the cost of R&D for innovative distribution grid projects by
establishing a mechanism that allows the costs to be partially passed through to customers
(Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) 2004). The 20-year review carried out in
2010 of the UK's existing RPI-X regulatory scheme noted that this incentive appeared to
have been very successful in stimulating R&D spending, as shown in Figure 5.
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Figure 5. R&D Spending in UK distribution networks. Source: Office of Gas and
Electricity Markets, "Regulating energy networks for the future: RPI-X@20 -
Innovation in energy networks: Is more needed and how can this be stimulated?"
(2009,5).
2. Including an additional revenue driver for innovative projects
This is the method employed by Ofgem in the UK under its Registered Power Zones
scheme. While this scheme in fact targets DG connections, the RPZ incentive gives an
additional E3/kW/year on top of the DG incentive to DG projects employing innovative
connection schemes, up to a cap of £0.5 million per distribution company (Office of Gas
and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) 2004, 46).
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3. Extending the length of the regulatory period
The 2007 DG-GRID study suggests that "a long-term framework, spanning several
regulatory periods with clear and reliable objectives for DSOs" can help stimulate
innovation (Scheepers, et al. 2007, 55). In its upcoming RIIO reform, Ofgem proposes
extending the price control period from five to eight years, in part to encourage
innovation (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) 2010). However, Ofgem did
not view this measure in itself as sufficient to encourage innovation and introduced a
separate innovation stimulus as well.
4. Benchmarking
The 2007 DG-GRID study argues that an incentive regulation scheme incorporating
average benchmarking will foster more innovation than frontier benchmarking, because
average benchmarking enables an innovative company to benefit more from the greater
productivity due to its innovations (Scheepers, et al. 2007). That said, the strength of this
argument depends on the scope of the benchmarking implementation. For example, if
losses are benchmarked it is true that a company might benefit from innovative solutions
to reduce network losses. But a company with an innovative solution to connect
expensive DG might not benefit from average benchmarking if DG connections are not
benchmarked.
5. Innovation as a separate regulated cost base
To acknowledge the longer-term returns from R&D on innovation, the 2007 DG-GRID
study suggests establishing a separate regulated asset base for innovation (Scheepers, et
al. 2007). This enables a higher rate of return to be applied to innovative projects,
although the design and regulation of such a scheme could be complex.
6. Mandating R&D
Citing Brazil as an example, the DG-GRID study suggests that mandating R&D spending
may be another way of encouraging innovation (Scheepers, et al. 2007). In Brazil, a 2000
law mandates that 1% of utilities' revenues is set aside for research; Jannuzzi finds that
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utilities undertook progressively longer, more expensive research projects as their
experience with R&D improved (Jannuzzi 2005, 1759-1760). Some of the money is
allocated to specific purposes such an R&D fund which allows for more risky and longer-
term projects to be funded. It is similar to the funding pot approach except that its funds
are determined as a percentage of utility sales revenues, so more R&D spending will
occur when utilities earn higher revenue. This differs from the UK approach to funding
pots, where the precise size of the pot has to date been established ex ante. The UK
approach might offer more predictability but the Brazilian approach maximizes the
potential of utilities' economic returns.
7. Funding pots
Funding pots that operate outside the main regulatory scheme are another means of
stimulating innovation. For the UK's 5th distribution price control from 2010-2015,
Ofgem introduced the E500m Low Carbon Networks fund directed at innovative projects
(Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) 2009, 3). While Ofgem's earlier
Innovation Funding Incentive funded innovative projects using cost pass-through, the
design of the Low Carbon Networks fund introduces an element of competition for the
funding which arguably stimulates more innovative projects. Currently, the Low Carbon
Networks fund operates alongside the existing Innovation Funding Incentive that funds
projects through cost pass-through. Ofgem suggests that the Incentive targets technical
R&D, while the fund targets innovative low carbon projects (106). Sharing of experiences
and lessons learnt from the pilot projects is a condition for receiving Low Carbon
Networks funding (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) 2009).
Ofgem's new RHO regulatory scheme to be applied to distribution from 2015 will
contain an innovation stimulus package (Network Innovation Competition) that will also
fund innovative projects separately from the price control process; in distribution, it will
be merged with the Low Carbon Networks fund (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets
(Ofgem) n.d.). The package will be introduced "until the incentives inherent to the RIIO
model are found to be encouraging required innovation themselves or there is a reduction
in the level of innovation required" (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) 2010,
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129). Thus, the stimulus operates as a temporary support to the regulatory scheme. The
package will be open to third party companies as well as the regulated networks (Office
of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) 2010).
The amount of money available for the Low Carbon Networks fund was established ex
ante as part of the price control decision. The innovation stimulus package is to be funded
through customer use of system charges. From the RHO proposals to date, it appears that
the amount of money available for the innovation stimulus package will also be
determined as part of the price control review process (Office of Gas and Electricity
Markets (Ofgem) 2010, 124).
The experiences of the countries studied here reveal that different approaches to
regulating innovation can modify the direction and length of innovation R&D spending. Funding
pots are useful in stimulating spending, although depending on how they are funded and
administered they may only stimulate projects of a certain length or scope. A mix of approaches,
such as lengthening the price control period, mandating R&D spending or establishing funding
pot contributions, might be needed to stimulate different areas such as spending on short versus
long-term innovative projects or on technical R&D versus innovative projects. A regulatory
design challenge is finding the balance appropriate to the electricity system in question. A
regulatory implementation challenge is appropriate oversight to determine what projects are
eligible for the different types of incentives.
The measures used to stimulate innovation might be similar to those used for DG - for
example, revenue drivers can help adjust remuneration to account for the costs of both DG and
innovative projects. Other measures do not overlap as much; for example, funding pots are more
useful for innovative projects since distribution companies have to be incentivized to make the
necessary capital investments upfront, while the concept of a per-kWh revenue driver is only
relevant to DG and not generic innovative projects. Depending on the priorities of the system, a
regulator may choose a mix of incentives.
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2.4.3 Developing Appropriate Regulation
Knowledge of the effects of new technologies, such as distributed generation or more
innovative network management approaches, on distribution network costs is useful to establish
the allowed revenue and can also inform the design and selection of appropriate regulatory
schemes and incentives. As described in Chapter 1, Reference Network Models or RNMs can
determine the network costs of connecting and supporting new technologies. The following
chapter describes and applies two types of RNMs to study distribution network costs under a
variety of new technology scenarios.
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Chapter 3: Modeling New Technologies in
the Electric Distribution Grid
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3.1 Modeling the Network Costs of New Technologies
This chapter models the network investments needed to accommodate new technologies
using two types of Reference Network Model (RNM): the greenfield model and the brownfield
model. The first half of this chapter describes the use of the greenfield model to analyze the cost
of building a distribution network under different scenarios of DG penetration. Results are
obtained for the investment costs needed to accommodate DG and the impact of DG on network
losses costs. These results are useful as an approximation to some of the potential costs and
benefits of DG in a network.
The second half of this chapter describes the analyses undertaken using the brownfield
model. The brownfield model can analyze the cost of expanding an existing network to
accommodate customers with demand response, distributed generation, and electric vehicles. In
this study, the cost of expanding the network is analyzed when the technologies are passively
managed, and when they are actively managed. These results are useful as an approximation of
the relative costs and benefits of different network management methods for new technologies.
3.2 Modeling Distributed Generation in Distribution Networks
As briefly touched on in Chapter 2, DG can have a positive or negative overall economic
effect on distribution companies. It may help the network reduce losses, but can also necessitate
greater expenditure on power quality and ancillary services for voltage control. The following
discussion of DG's costs and benefits draws upon G6mez ((forthcoming)).
Distributed generation may add to network costs in several ways. First, the presence of
new distributed generators means an additional component to connect to the system, implying a
connection cost. This connection cost will be higher the further away the distributed generators
are from the network, since the length of lines required will be longer. Second, the presence of
distributed generators may add to network losses costs especially when DG penetration is so high
that DG supplies most of the energy demanded by the network, meaning that net power flows are
in the opposite direction to power flows in the situation without DG. Third, distributed
generation may add to system operation costs since there is a need to manage an additional
power source within the network. Fourth, DG whose generation is variable and imperfectly
predictable (such as small-scale solar or wind) may affect aspects of quality of service such as
voltage quality and can necessitate additional investments in measurement and control systems to
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maintain the same level of quality of service, or additional investments in ancillary services for
spinning reserve capacity to fill the gaps in DG power production (G6mez (forthcoming)).
In other ways distributed generation may provide benefits to the network, decreasing
network costs. Distributed generators located close to customers may help meet demand for
generation located far away, reducing the cost of upstream losses in the distribution network. The
contributions of DG to power generation may also decrease the need for future investment in the
network. If the network has to meet targets relating to greenhouse gas emissions or
environmental protection, renewable DG may help replace conventional, more polluting
generators. DG could also be an enabler of islanded grid operation, in which a part of the grid is
isolated from the rest of the network when its connection to the network is broken or disabled
(for protection from faults in other parts of the grid, for example) so that it has to operate in
islanded mode. DG within the "island" may serve as a backup generator supplying the island
with electricity and ensuring continued operation. This can improve the network's performance
on quality of service metrics (G6mez (forthcoming)).
Knowledge of the network costs and benefits of integrating DG can thus assist regulators
and companies in planning for the future. In the following sections, a greenfield reference
network model is used to analyze the network costs of integrating DG into distribution networks.
3.2.1 Description of the Greenfield Model
The greenfield model is able to model the cost of building the optimal distribution
network required to serve the customers and DG units that are set as input. As the network is
built from scratch, the costs of the network may be interpreted as an approximation to long-run
network costs. The following description of the greenfield model in use for this analysis draws
upon the descriptions of the model and the modeling process in Mateo Domingo, et al. (2010)
and Cossent, et al. (2010).
The "greenfield" reference network model takes as input the set of customers in a given
network's service area. In the following discussion, a customer is an entity or household that has
entered into a contract with the distribution network for power delivery. In the data provided to
the model, each customer is georeferred by his geographical coordinates and contractedpower
capacity. The contracted power capacity is the maximum amount of power the customer may
draw from the distribution network. More than one customer may have the same geographical
coordinate when, for example, the customers are located in the same apartment building. In the
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following discussion, each unique geographical coordinate is termed a consumption point. In
general, a power line is built to each consumption point, and multiple customers connected to
that consumption point may draw their power from that line. Customer data may be provided for
high, medium, and low voltage customers separately.
A second type of input data is the set of distributed generation installations connected to
the network. Each DG installation is georeferred by its geographical (GPS) coordinates and the
maximum power capacity each unit is contracted to contribute to the network.
Table 4. Greenfield model input data.
Data Type Description of data
Customer Geographical coordinates of customers, contracted capacity,
connection voltage
Distributed Geographical coordinates of generating units, contracted
Generation capacity, connection voltage
Supply Geographical coordinates of transmission substations (power
points supply points to the distribution network)
Network Type of equipment (e.g. substations, lines), technical
equipment specifications (e.g. voltage level), economic specifications (e.g.
investment cost, maintenance cost)
Technical Parameters such as customer simultaneity factors
constraints
Economic Parameters such as weighted average cost of capital (WACC)
parameters
Continuity Reliability indices relating to the required reliability of the
of supply network (for example, regulatory reliability requirements)
A third type of input data is data for transmission substations. These serve as power
supply points for the distribution network. The model builds the distribution network given the
coordinates and capacity of the transmission substations.
The model also takes a catalogue of network equipment data as input, to be used to build
the output network. Network equipment data includes the technical specifications (voltage level,
power, etc.) and the financial data (investment cost, maintenance cost, etc.) for each piece of
equipment.
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Finally, the model also takes as input a parameters file in which network-wide technical
constraints, economic parameters, and continuity of supply indices can be set. Technical
constraints include simultaneity factors for customers at low, medium, and high voltages. As it is
highly unlikely that all customers simultaneously demand their full contracted power capacity
from the network, the simultaneity factor for customers is an important technical parameter.
Intuitively, this factor reflects the proportion of network demand that occurs simultaneously. It is
possible to set different simultaneity factors for customers at low, medium and high voltage
levels. An estimate of an LV customer's effective power demand is then given by the LV
customer simultaneity factor multiplied by the customer's contracted capacity. Economic
parameters include the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). Continuity of supply indices
such as those defined by the IEEE (SAIDI, etc.) may be input to take account of regulatory
requirements relating to network reliability.
The above data are necessary to run the greenfield model. In addition, it is possible to
input additional supply point data such as the location of existing MV-LV substations instead of
having the model create the optimal substations. However, such additional data is not necessary
to run the greenfield model. Table 4 summarizes the greenfield model's data requirements.
Given the required input data, the model designs the network necessary to serve the
customers and DG installations. First, the customers (loads) and distributed generators are
modeled and classified by their number and load density as urban, suburban, concentrated rural,
scattered rural, and industrial. Second, the model optimizes the network layout required to serve
the input loads and distributed generators. Third, the model performs a power flow analysis for
the layout and places the required power system equipment into the layout. The equipment and
corresponding costs are taken from the network equipment data provided as input. Algorithms
are used to size the network given the engineering constraints imputed by the locations and peak
power flow needs of customers and distributed generation. The cost of the network is also
minimized. Finally, the model adds any additional power system equipment required to ensure
the network meets quality of supply requirements defined by the input continuity of supply
indices. The final network is optimized from a technical and economic perspective.
The model produces two types of output files that fully describe the network required to
serve the given set of customers and DG installations. First, it produces tables of cost and power
flow data for the network required. The costs are broken down by network component (lines,
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substations, and so on) and by type (capital investment, preventive maintenance, corrective
maintenance, and losses). Second, the model produces a set of geographical information files in
.SHX format. .SHX files may be opened in the software program ArcExplorer by ESRI (Esri,
Inc. n.d.). When mapped in ArcExplorer, the set of files produces a visual representation of the
geographical layout of the network required. Figure 6 summarizes the greenfield model's input
and output processes. Several points relating to the brownfield model are also included in the
figure; the brownfield model is described later in this chapter.
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Figure 6. Flow diagram of model. An asterisk sign (*) denotes data input to the brownfield
model only. Adapted from Cossent, et al. (2010).
It is important to note that the model does not include the exogenous capital costs of
extrinsic control systems, software, and management systems that may be utilized by the utility
to manage distributed generation power flows. The model calculates only costs intrinsic to the
power network, such as higher-capacity wires or more substations needed to transmit the power
flows. Exogenous capital costs can vary greatly depending on the size of the network, the
number of customers, and the amount and quality of new technologies being installed. These
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costs exist not only for distributed generation but also for other new technologies involving
control systems and communications, such as advanced metering infrastructure. Table 2 shows
that distribution system-related capital investments reported to date using funds from the US'
Smart Grid Investment Grants total over US$3.5 billion. A separate Electric Power Research
Institute (EPRI) report estimates the costs of network modernization for the entire US grid (but
does not separate out control systems that are specifically for DG); that report estimates the
capital costs of installing distribution automation for the entire US distribution system to be
between US$124-177 billion (Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 2011, 6-17).
3.3 Modeling DG: Locations, Power Output, Penetration
It was desired to study the effect on network costs of DG located near to and far away
from residential customers, at various DG per-unit power output levels and customer penetration
levels. Throughout the following discussion, the penetration level of distributed generation refers
to the percentage of customers who are modeled as having a DG installation. The following
sections present the methodology and results for DG near to customers (residential DG),
followed by the methodology and results for DG far away from customers.
3.4 DG Located Near to Customers
3.4.1 Methodology
A network of 66,848 customers was selected for analysis. Several customers in this
network had the same geographical coordinates. This is the case when, for example, multiple
customers are on record for the same apartment building location. Thus, despite there being
66,848 customers, there were a total of 14,492 unique geographical consumption points. Each of
the 66,848 customers has a contracted power with the electric utility.
The model was run to compare the costs of building a network without distributed
generation to the costs of building a network where 25, 50, 75, and 100% of customers had a
residential distributed generation installation. To focus the results on the medium voltage (MV)
and low voltage (LV) distribution networks, the transmission substations and HV-MV
substations acting as supply points had their locations fixed in the same locations for all cases.
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Two types of scenarios were used in this study. A "base" scenario consisting of 2 base
cases with no or negligible DG power contributions to the network was developed for reference.
The first base case B-1 represents the cost of building the network without any distributed
generation installations. The network was built and network costs calculated for the 66,848
customers and levels of contracted power ranging from 3.3 kW to 10 kW. In the second base
case B-2, the network was built for the same customers but 25% of customers were randomly
selected to have a distributed generation installation that output negligible power. This base case
therefore enables analysis of the connection costs of DG installations at the 25% penetration
level.
Three "generation" scenarios were developed for the analysis of residential DG, each
with a different power output per DG unit. Generation scenario 1 consisted of DG installations
with a power output of 3 kW/unit. Generation scenario 2 consisted of DG installations with a
power output of 0.5 kW/unit. Generation scenario 3 consisted of an equal mix of both types of
DG installations: 50% of all units had a power output of 0.5 kW/unit and 50% had a power
output of 3 kW/unit. For each of the generation scenarios, the model was run 4 times to obtain
results for 4 cases representing 4 DG penetration levels: 25, 50, 75, and 100%; these 4 cases
were named G1-25, G2-50, G3-75, and G4-100 respectively. At each DG penetration level, the
corresponding percentage of customers was randomly selected to have a DG installation. The
customers selected for the 25% penetration level case were the same as those modeled in base
case B-2, to facilitate comparison of the results. In total, the model was run 14 times to obtain
results for 2 base cases and 12 generation cases. Figure 7 summarizes the cases analyzed.
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Figure 7. Modeling cases for residential DG
Throughout the generation scenarios studied, the power consumption and location of the
66,848 existing customers of the network were kept the same, with the only change being the
addition of DG installations to the randomly selected customer locations. The coordinates of the
DG installations were displaced by approximately 4.24 m from the customer coordinates to
prevent the model from inaccurately consolidating the customers and installations. Because the
greenfield model does not permit a time-differentiated power output, in order to run the model it
was assumed that the DG installations produce a constant power output over time. In practice,
this might be feasible for micro-CHP but is less likely for small-scale wind and solar. (The
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brownfield version of the model, discussed later in this chapter, is able to model time-
differentiated power output broken down by hour for 24 hours of a day.)
A summary of descriptive statistics relating to the network and its customers are
presented in Table 5.
Table 5. Descriptive statistics of network
Unique Customers 66,848
Maximum Power Contracted (kW) 10
Minimum Power Contracted (kW) 3.3
Total Power Contracted (MW) 420
Unique Consumption Points 14,492
Customer simultaneity factor 0.3
3.4.2 Results
Results are presented for the base cases and for each DG power output level.
Base Cases
The results for the base cases are shown in Table 6 and a graphical representation of the
base network built for case B-1 is provided for reference in Figure 8.
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Table 6. Results for the base cases
Base Case B-1
Replacement
cost of fixed
assets
(Investment
cost) (euros)
11,654,587
3,993,400
6,947,404
447,977
23,043,368
Replacement
cost of fixed
assets
(Investment
cost)
(euros)
13,831,590
4,074,800
7,890,241
430,853
26,227,483
Preventive Corrective
maintenance maintenance
cost cost
(annual) (annual)
(euros) (euros)
2,057 30,904
259,660 10,303
81,492 73,215
10,181 4,717
353,390 119,139
Base Case B-2
Preventive Corrective
maintenance maintenance
cost cost
(annual) (annual)
(euros) (euros)
2,410 36,201
263,720 10,466
96,981 73,359
9,792 4,537
372,903 124,563
Losses
costs
(euros)
Total
(NPV)
(euros)
254,967 14,429,161
117,138 10,411,577
62,469 10,586,919
6,351 801,235
440,926 36,228,893
Losses
costs
(euros)
Total
(NPV)
(euros)
283,275 16,954,384
117,043 10,577,444
64,558 11,862,585
7,736 784,074
472,612 40,178,488
Percentage
contribution
to total cost
(%)
39.83
28.74
29.22
2.21
100
Percentage
contribution
to total cost
(%)
42.2
26.33
29.52
1.95
100
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Figure 8. Graphical representation of the network for base case B-I
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Generation Cases
For each of the 3 DG power output levels studied, results are presented for 4 DG
penetration levels (25, 50, 75, and 100%). The results from the 2 base cases are included for
comparison.7
Table 7. Results for base and generating cases at each penetration level studied. "Total Network
Costs" are the sum of investment, maintenance, and losses costs output by the model.
Total Network Costs (NPV) (euros)
Generation Scenario 1 - 3 kW/unit
Case B-1 B-2 G1-25 G2-50 G3-75 G4-100
DG Installed 0 0 50.09 100.72 150.92 200.54
Power (MVA)
LV network 14,429,161 16,954,384 16,268,081 15,279,359 15,235,803 17,806,871
MV-LV 10,411,577 10,577,444 7,731,557 6,015,315 9,476,494 8,739,085
substations
MV network 10,586,919 11,862,585 10,314,742 8,565,718 16,266,901 14,041,802
HV network 801,235 784,074 738,308 722,304 720,133 720,133
GRAND 36,228,893 40,178,488 35,052,688 30,582,696 41,699,331 41,307,891
TOTAL
Generation Scenario 2 - 0.5 kW/unit
DG Installed 0 0 8.35 16.79 25.15 33.42
Power (MVA)
LV network 14,429,161 16,954,384 16,968,438 17,656,200 17,742,066 18,331,447
MV-LV 10,411,577 10,577,444 10,166,844 9,908,161 9,583,955 8,979,349
substations
MV network 10,586,919 11,862,585 12,227,058 11,816,896 12,547,549 12,259,824
HV network 801,235 784,074 768,799 764,476 751,190 753,927
GRAND 36,228,893 40,178,488 40,131,138 40,145,734 40,624,761 40,324,547
TOTAL
Generation Scenario 3 -0.5 and 3 kW/unit
DG Installed 0 0 29.25 58.97 88.26 117.16
Power (MVA)
LV network 14,429,161 16,954,384 16,693,151 16,880,013 16,364,337 14,553,149
MV-LV 10,411,577 10,577,444 900,735 7,481,772 6,295,653 9,804,855
substations
MV network 10,586,919 11,862,585 11,149,670 9,814,224 9,140,520 12,059,399
HV network 801,235 784,074 749,400 735,085 724,250 720,552
GRAND 36,228,893 40,178,488 37,592,957 34,911,094 32,524,761 37,137,956
TOTAL
7 The model takes input for DG per-unit power output in kW. The results tables output by the model compute the
total DG power output and present it in MVA. As DG is connected using direct current, the volt-ampere (VA) unit is
equivalent to the watts (W) unit for power. In general, this study will place units in the same position they are in the
model.
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The results for each scenario are presented graphically in Figures 9-11 to facilitate a
comparison of costs with respect to DG penetration level. The cost results are plotted alongside
the effective customer power demand in the network, which is the contracted power multiplied
by the simultaneity factor. The DG installed power is also plotted, as is the net power (the
contracted power minus the DG installed power). Figure 12 shows graphical representations of
the networks displayed in ArcExplorer for the 2 base cases and the 4 generating cases analyzed
for generation scenario 1 with a DG power output of 3 kW.
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Figure 9. Results for generation scenario 1 with a DG power output of 0.5 kW/unit
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Figure 10. Results for generation scenario 2 with a DG power output of 3 kW/unit
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Generation Scenario 3
DG Power Output = 3 and 0.5 kW/unit
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Figure 11. Results for generation scenario 3 with 50% of units having a DG power output of 0.5
kW/unit and 50% having a DG power output of 3 kW/unit
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Figure 12. Network diagrams showing the LV, MV, and HV networks built by the model and the
input transmission substations for the 2 base cases and the 4 generating cases studied for
generation scenario 1.
3.4.3 Discussion
Total network costs decrease and then increase across generating cases within both
generation scenarios 1 and 3, as shown in Figures 9 and 11. The U-shape pattern of costs is
consistent across both these cases. However, for generation case 2 where DG power output is
very low at 0.5 kW, total network costs do not change noticeably with DG penetration level.
For generation scenario ] (DG power output = 3 kW/unit), the increase in total cost from
base case B-1 (no DG) to base case B-2 (25% penetration of DG with negligible generation)
shown in Table 7 may be interpreted as the connection cost of that DG. Subsequently, from case
B-2 to case G1-25% the total cost decreases as DG power generation increases. This may be
because the DG reduces the need for long and medium-distance transportation of power from
conventional generation facilities, thus reducing the MV network costs and the total costs. In
other words, the cost decrease may be interpreted as the benefit from DG contributions to the
network. From case Gl-25 to G2-50, total network costs continue to decrease.
Subsequently, network costs increase when moving from case G2-50 to G3-75. In Figure
9 the plot of net power demand (demand corrected for the customer simultaneity factor, less the
power generated by DG) shows that from 50% to 75% DG penetration, the net power demanded
turns negative (from 25.3 MVA to -24.9 MVA). Therefore, when moving from 50% to 75% DG
penetration, DG power production begins to exceed the power demand in the network and DG
becomes the main source of power for the network. Significant DG power generation implies
power flows in the reverse direction to the base cases, since power flows from residential DG to
customers instead of from transmission substations to customers. These directional changes in
network power flows may account for the total cost increase when moving from 50% to 75%
penetration.
Finally, a total cost decrease from case G3-75 to G4-100 penetration is observed. The
detailed cost breakdown in Table 7 shows that from 75% to 100% penetration, the cost of LV
networks increases considerably but the cost of MV networks and MV-LV substations decrease.
The changes in costs may reflect the consequences of a high penetration of DG connected at
residential customer locations: most power is being generated and consumed within the low
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voltage network, so LV network costs increase. Since the DG connected at LV is sufficient to
meet the network power demand, less power flows from higher voltages through the medium
voltage network and MV network costs decrease. The cost decrease at MV slightly outweighs
the cost increase at LV, resulting in the decrease in total costs when moving from 75% to 100%
penetration. Figure 12 illustrates how the networks built for cases G3-75 and G4-100, where DG
production exceeds network demand differ from the networks built in other cases where DG
production is less than network demand.
For generation scenario 2 (DG power output = 0.5 kW/unit), the changes in costs as
penetration level varies are not large, as illustrated in Figure 10, which may reflect the low level
of power output by DG. These results suggest that few network reinforcements will be necessary
to accommodate even high penetrations of residential DG, if each individual DG unit's power
output is very low. Such a situation might arise for very small-scale installations, for example of
solar PV panels.
For generation scenario 3 (DG power output = 0.5 and 3 kW/unit), cost trends follow the
same U-shape pattern as for generation scenario 1. Total costs decrease as penetration increases
from 0% to 75%, then increase from 75% to 100%. It can be seen in Figure 11 that the costs
begin increasing again when the total DG production increases from 88 to 117 MVA (from 75%
to 100% penetration), or, equivalently, when net demand in the network decreases from 38 MW
to 9 MW. These results suggest that network costs can begin increasing even before DG
production begins to exceed network demand.
In both generation scenarios 1 and 3, changes in total costs appear to be driven by cost
trends at the MV level, although the LV network plays a role particularly at higher DG
penetration levels. Finally, it is important to note that the level of residential DG installed power
at which costs begin to increase after initially decreasing, depends on the system demand. A cost
driver is net system demand, which is the demand taking into account simultaneity factors and
DG power contributions.
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3.5 DG Located Far Away from Customers
3.5.1 Methodology
Following an examination of the results for DG located near to customers, it was desired
to study DG more closely by modeling DG with a similar total power output, but with generating
units located far away from customers. Such conurbations of DG may represent large wind or
solar farms. Each DG conurbation was modeled as a single generating point with a power output
representing the combined power output of all the individual generating units (e.g. turbines, solar
PV panels) within the farm.
For the earlier case with DG located near to customers, the cost results for generation
scenario 1 display the most interesting U-shape trend when DG power output is between 50-200
MVA. Therefore, it was decided to study DG located far away from customers at 4 power output
levels between 50-200 MVA: 50, 100, 150, and 200 MVA. To ensure the results were reasonably
comparable with the previous cases for DG located near to customers, the transmission
substations and HV-MV substations acting as supply points to the distribution network had their
locations fixed in the same locations as in the previous cases.
Costs relating to far away DG were examined by modeling the change in costs as new
generating points (for example, new wind farms) are added to the network. New generating
points were added so as to change the total DG power output level to obtain results for total DG
power output of 50-200 MVA.
The model was run 6 times to obtain results for 2 base cases, BF-50 and BF-200, and 4
generating cases, F-50, F-100, F-150 and F-200. The generating points in base case BF-50
corresponded to those present in the generating case F-50, and those in base case BF-200
corresponded to generating case F-200, but in both base cases the generating points were
assigned a negligible power output. In the corresponding generating case F-50, the total power
output of all the DG generating points was 50 MVA and in the corresponding generating case F-
200, the total power output was 200 MVA.
The 4 generating cases represented the 4 total DG power output levels studied: 50, 100,
150, and 200 MVA. These cases were denoted F-50, F-100, F-150, and F-200 respectively. The
base and generating cases are detailed in Table 8.
94
Table 8. Modeling cases for DG located far away from customers
DG Far Away from Customers
Case Code BF-50 BF-200 F-50 F-100 F-150 F-200
Number of generating 10 40 10 20 30 40points
Power output per DG
generating point 5 5 5 5 5 5
(MVA)
Total DG output 0 0 50 100 150 200(MVA)
3.5.2 Results
Table 9 presents the detailed cost results for the 2 base cases and 4 generating cases. The
remaining tables and figures in this section present additional analyses of the results.
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Table 9. Results for DG located far away from customers.
Total Costs (euros)
Case BF-50 BF-200 F-50 F-100 F-150 F-200
Number of
generating 10 40 10 20 30 40
points
DG power
output/gene 5 5 5 5 5 5rating point
(MVA)
Total DG
output 0 0 50 100 150 200
(MVA)
Investment Costs (euros)
LV network 11,722,562 11,760,198 11,821,200 11,829,378 11,804,366 11,776,546
MV-LV
substations 3,993,400 3,993,400 3,993,400 3,993,400 3,993,400 3,993,400
MV
network 6,870,478 7,048,157 6,979,208 7,367,879 7,551,140 8,678,164
HV network 447,977 447,977 447,977 447,977 447,977 447,977
TOTAL 23,034,417 23,249,732 23,241,785 23,638,634 23,796,883 24,896,087
Losses Costs (euros)
LV network 254,967 254,967 254,967 254,967 254,967 254,967
MV-LV
substations 117,138 117,138 117,138 117,138 117,138 117,138
MV
network 64,913 64,618 113,577 88,208 96,410 83,719
HV network 6,182 6,351 6,605 4,505 5,916 6,523
TOTAL 443,201 443,075 492,288 464,818 474,432 462,347
Total Network Costs (investment+maintenance+losses) (NPV) (euros)
LV network 14,497,137 14,534,772 14,595,775 14,603,953 14,578,940 14,551,121
MV-LV
substations 10,411,577 10,411,577 10,411,577 10,411,577 10,411,577 10,411,577
MV
network 10,492,302 11,326,320 11,731,369 11,771,021 12,284,497 14,009,518
HV network 799,840 801,235 803,337 785,960 797,636 802,657
GRAND 36,200,856 37,073,905 37,542,058 37,572,511 38,072,651 39,774,873TOTAL
Percentage
increase on 0.08% 1.33% 4.47%previous
case (%)
Note: Maintenance costs are not shown for brevity, but are included in the model's calculation of
total costs.
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Table 10. Comparing investment costs for base and generating cases
Investment Costs (euros)
BF-50 F-50 BF-200 F-200
LV network 11,722,562 11,821,200 11,760,198 11,776,546
MV-LV substations 3,993,400 3,993,400 3,993,400 3,993,400
MV network 6,870,478 6,979,208 7,048,157 8,678,164
HV network 447,977 447,977 447,977 447,977
TOTAL 23,034,417 23,241,785 23,249,732 24,896,087
Percentage increase
on corresponding 0.90% 7.08%
base case (%)
Total Network Costs
DG Power Output = 50-200 MVA
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Figure 13. Total network costs for the base and generating cases
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Figure 15. Percentage increase in investment cost for aerial MV lines in generating
cases F-100 through F-200, relative to the F-50 case
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Figure 16. Graphical representations of the networks built for the 50 MVA and 200 MVA
generating cases alongside their respective base cases, illustrating the difference caused by
generation
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Figure 17. Graphical representations of all 4 generating cases illustrating the network changes
caused by increasing the number of generating points
3.5.3 Discussion
For DG located far away from customers, total network costs do not change significantly
as total DG generation output increases, as shown in Figure 13. Most cost increases are
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associated with the MV network, since the wind farms are connected to the MV network. The
more detailed MV network component cost analysis of Figure 14 shows that most MV network
costs are driven by the costs of aerial MV lines. This is reasonable as the new aerial lines are
required to connect the new generating points that are added to the network when moving from
case F-50 to case F-200.
For aerial MV lines, the cost differences between the 4 generating cases are notable as
shown in Figure 15. The clear trend is for these costs to increase as generating points are added
to the network. Aerial MV lines required in case F-100 have a cost that is 150% of the cost in
case F-50, whereas aerial MV lines required in case F-200 have a total cost that is 300% of the
cost in case F-50.
Table 9 compares the total network costs for the base cases and generating cases.' The
difference in total network costs between the base case BF-200 with 40 non-generating DG
points and the base case B-i without any DG (which could be considered an approximation to
the connection cost) is 0.845 million euros to whereas the cost difference between the F-200
generating case and BF-200 base case (which could be considered an approximation of the
network costs of DG generation) is 2.70 million euros (to 3 s.f.). That is, for this case the
connection cost of building wires to new locations is relatively small but the cost to
accommodate the DG units' generating capacity can be significant. A consideration of the
technical specifications of the lines built by the model suggests the increase in cost can be traced
in part to the need for more expensive lines with a higher capacity for the generating case, and in
part to the different optimal configurations output by the model for generating and base cases.
That said, relative to the corresponding base cases, the investment costs of accommodating far
away DG are not very large. As Table 10 shows, the differences in investment cost between the
generating case F-50 and the base case BF-50, and between the generating case F-200 and the
base case BF-200 are 0.90% and 7.08% respectively.
As Figure 16 shows, increasing the generating output for each generating point (while
keeping the generating points at the same location) can change the optimal network
8 The difference between the BF-50 case and the earlier B-i case is about -0.028 million euros. The cost difference
is negative because although a greater length of MV lines are required in the B-50 case (113.12 kin) than the B-I
case without any DG (105.39 km), the model builds a greater number of cheaper aerial lines in the B-50 case. As the
wind farms in BF-50 are far away from customers, these aerial lines are long and can sometimes also replace
previously needed, more expensive underground lines. Ultimately, this decreases the total cost for BF-50 relative to
B-1.
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configuration. This suggests long-term cost implications for distribution networks if, for example,
a wind farm decides to upgrade its turbines so that its overall power generation level increases
significantly. Hence it is clearly important whether distribution companies include the projected
contributions of DG (in terms of both locations and capacity) in their expansion planning
processes, or whether they utilize a "fit and forget" approach to network planning. (Passive
network management, closely related to the "fit and forget" approach, is analyzed with the
brownfield model in the second half of this chapter.)
Figure 17 illustrates the different network configurations when new wind farms are added
to the MV network. As shown, the optimal configurations and costs of MV lines can change
considerably when new wind farms are added in new locations far away from customers. In
practice, distribution companies may not always be able to achieve the optimal network
configuration owing to the placement of existing lines. However, as Table 9 illustrates, the
impact on overall network costs is small as total DG power output increases. The incremental
increase in cost when moving from the F-50 through the F-100, F-150, and F-200 cases ranges
from 30,500 to 1.70 million euros (to 3 s.f.), or 0.08% to 4.47%. These results suggest that
significant additional remuneration may not be needed to add a substantial number of non-local
distributed generation units. This has implications for the design and implementation of
connection and use of system charges for DG, which are described in Chapter 4.
In general for these cases with DG located far away from customers, both the overall
network cost analysis (Figure 13) and the detailed MV network cost analysis (Figure 14) do not
show the same U-shaped trend that is found for residential DG. Instead, costs steadily increase as
the amount of network power supplied by distributed generation increases. Even when net
system demand turns negative, the upwards cost trend does not change. The size of the cost
increase as generating points are added to the network is also relatively small. In terms of the
overall network cost, the difference between scenario F-200 (with 40 generating points) and F-50
(with 10 generating points) is less than 5%. Although the relative changes in costs for aerial MV
lines are significant when considered in isolation, these costs do not constitute a significant part
of the total network cost. At most (case F-200), the aerial MV lines make up 6.14% of the total
network costs. Therefore, the changes in costs for the aerial MV lines do not translate into a
significant difference in total network costs.
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3.6 Comparison of Results for DG Located Near to and Far Away from
Customers
The selection of DG installed power levels for the study of DG located far away from
customers permits comparison of the results with those for residential DG with a 3 kW/unit
output power. These two types of DG location are denoted here as far-DG and near-DG
respectively. In particular, the penetration levels 25, 50, 75, and 100% of near-DG can broadly
correspond to the total DG installed power of 50, 100, 150, and 200 MVA studied for far-DG.
Figures 18-20 show the total network costs, investment costs, and losses costs plotted against
total DG installed power for both types of DG location. On all figures, the effective customer
demand (the total customer demand multiplied by the simultaneity factor) is marked as a
reference point.
In making comparisons between these two types of DG locations, it is important to note
that the near-DG units were connected to the low voltage distribution network whereas the far-
DG units were connected to the medium voltage distribution network. In terms of voltage, thus,
the comparison is not a direct one. However, the results for investment costs and losses can
illuminate whether it is more beneficial to connect DG at dispersed locations using the LV
network or in wind farm-like conurbations using the MV network.
Total network costs
for different DG locations
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Figure 18. Comparison of total network costs for different DG locations
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Figure 20. Comparison of losses costs for different DG locations
As shown in Figures 18-20, total network costs differ by a small amount depending on
DG location. The investment cost differences between the near-DG and far-DG results are larger
at higher levels of DG installed power. Required investments (in the LV and MV networks, and
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MV-LV substations) for near-DG cases decrease as DG penetration increases until DG installed
power approaches total system demand, after which the required investments increase. Far-DG
investment costs generally relate only to the MV network and for the cases where DG
contributes 150 MVA and above of power, the investments required for far-DG are lower than
those required for near-DG. A reason for this may be that as the far-DG units are both fewer in
number and less dispersed through the network than the near-DG units, less extensive MV
reinforcements are needed to accommodate them when they supply a majority of network
demand compared to the extensive reinforcements required in the LV network for near-DG units
supplying a similar amount of power.
Although far-DG can be cheaper than near-DG at higher levels of DG installed power, it
is worth noting the effects of near-DG on the costs of losses. At every level of DG installed
power studied, losses costs are lower for near-DG than far-DG. As near-DG units are located at
residential customer sites, the power generated may be transmitted only over a short distance
before it is consumed; this reduces the power flows upstream and so the overall cost of line
losses decreases. These results illustrate the potential benefits of residential DG installations
relative to far away DG installations. That said, the results for near-DG also show that losses
costs increase at very high penetration levels whereas the far-DG results do not display such a
marked change. In terms of losses costs, it may yet be beneficial to avoid very high penetration
of near-DG.
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3.7 Modeling Passive and Active Management of Distribution Networks
Knowledge of the effects of integrating several new technologies into an existing network
can help regulators and companies that are modernizing existing electric grids. Additionally,
knowledge of the cost implications of passive and active management of such new technologies
can be useful in determining the costs and benefits of different management systems.
Passive management refers to a situation where new technologies are installed and draw
or contribute power to the network, but these power flows are not managed by the distribution
companies operating the network. In countries where restructuring or privatization of the electric
power sector has occurred to separate generation from the distribution network business, or
where independent distributed generators play a significant role in the industry, this issue is more
important as the distribution company has less direct control over generation. Passive
management requires a network to be sized for maximum capacity in a "fit and forget" approach,
since the network must have sufficient capacity to handle a 'worst-case' scenario of many new
technologies connecting at once.
Active management refers to a situation where the new technologies are installed and
their power flows managed by the distribution company to optimize the network's performance
and investment costs. For example, distributed generation could be managed so it is dispatched
to supply the network at times of high demand and is stored at times of low demand. Power flow
management could also be directed by more sophisticated real-time capacity monitoring systems,
electricity price signals from the open market, and other metrics. Real-time system protection
and voltage control of the fluctuations that may be caused by new technologies like DG can also
be implemented as part of active network management. Another aspect of active network
management is reconfiguration of the medium voltage network, for example by selectively
utilizing feeders and rerouting power flows so that the network is operated in a meshed rather
than a radial configuration. This may help the network respond to unusual power demand or
outage situations. The installation of new sensors, communications, and control systems is
generally required to achieve active network management.
Active network management has been discussed in literature, particularly with respect to
Europe where distributed generation uptake is reaching a level that enables active management
to be seriously considered (Djapic, et al. 2007). Among the perceived benefits of active network
management are a reduction in network capacity requirements (compared to the requirements
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with passive network management) and a corresponding deferment of capital investment
requirements. Figure 21 illustrates this benefit.
Figure 21. Comparing the passive (BAU) and active management of networks.
Source: Djapic, et al., "Taking an Active Approach" in IEEE Power and Energy
Magazine (2007, 70).
Most discussions of active management center on DG, because in an actively managed
network DG connections would be facilitated by the ability under active management to dispatch
DG when necessary, use DG for ancillary services in addition to power generation, and
otherwise optimize the use of DG (Pegas Lopes, et al. 2007, Djapic, et al. 2007). "Active"
integration of DG could allow DG to be used to meet network requirements relating to
performance, reliability, and security of supply among others. Such use of DG could provide
wider economic benefits to the distribution companies by deferring or substituting for investment
in additional power system components. As an example, Figure 22 illustrates the difference in
required power system components when a 30 MW DG unit is incorporated into network
planning to help meet security of supply requirements. When DG is used, as on the right side of
the figure, it replaces otherwise necessary investment in a third circuit T3.
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Figure 22. Passive and active integration of DG in a network. Source: Djapic, et al.,
"Taking an Active Approach" in IEEE Power and Energy Magazine (2007, 75).
The potential benefits of active management thus merit further study. Knowledge of such
costs and benefits can assist companies and regulators in planning network operations and
ensuring appropriate remuneration for networks under various operation scenarios.
3.7.1 Description of the Brownfield Model
The brownfield model is able to model the cost of upgrading an existing network to meet
the demands of new technologies. It is furthermore able to model the difference between
managing these new technologies passively and actively.
Like the greenfield reference network model, the brownfield reference network model
outputs the cost of building a network given various input considerations relating to the number
of customers, the locations and generation capacity of distributed generation, and so on.
Although the greenfield model is able to construct a network from scratch given data on the
power demand of customers in the area, the brownfield model requires an existing electricity
network and set of customers as input data. The brownfield model then constructs the network
extensions and upgrades necessary to accommodate new customers or new technologies, and
calculates the cost of these extensions and upgrades. The existing electricity network data input
to the brownfield model may be from files describing a network output by a run of the greenfield
model, or from files created manually in the required format describing an existing network.
The brownfield model takes as input time-differentiated power demand (or generation)
profiles for customer consumption points, distributed generation, and electric vehicles as
illustrated in Figure 6. Each consumption point and each distributed generator may have a 24-
hour demand (or generation) profile attached to it to simulate the power it demands (or
generates) for each hour, over 24 hours. The brownfield model then sizes the network given the
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24-hour power demand/consumption profiles for the customers, DG, and EVs connected to the
network. Therefore active network management can be modeled by, for example, shaving a
consumption point's demand during the peak hours of the 24-hour power demand profile.
Passive network management can be modeled by not making any exogenous changes to the
shape of the demand profiles - equivalent to the utility not managing connected demand.
3.7.2 Description of the Base Network for the Brownfield Model
The brownfield model works from an existing network to build the additional network
needed to connect new customers, DG and electric vehicles. To create the existing network, the
greenfield model described in the first half of this chapter was run. The greenfield model
produced output files describing the characteristics of the existing network. These files were
input to the brownfield model to provide it with the required existing network.
An initial network of 66,848 customers was selected to serve as the base network for the
brownfield model and the files describing the base network were created by running the
greenfield model. Given default input parameters the greenfield model designs an idealized base
network with sufficient spare capacity to minimize the cost of losses over the network planning
horizon, assuming that network components are installed today with a useful life of 40 years.
However, this ideal does not represent most distribution networks in use today. Most networks
today would not have such significant spare capacity in their components since most network
equipment has been installed for at least several years and their spare capacity has been partially
used by the natural electricity demand growth of the population. Therefore, it was decided to
reduce the spare capacity of the base network by reducing the parameter for cost of losses in the
greenfield model. This ensures the model sizes less spare capacity into the network for losses.
The result is a network of components with a higher capacity utilization that is likely to be a
more realistic representation of distribution networks in use today. The passive and active
management cases were run on this more realistic network. For comparison, several cases were
also run with the idealized base network with a higher spare capacity and a selection of these
results are presented later in the chapter. Descriptive statistics and a graphical representation of
the more realistic base network are provided in Table 11 and Figure 23 respectively.
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Table 11. Descriptive statistics of base network
Customers
Unique Customers 66,848
Unique Consumption Points 14,492
Total Power Contracted (MW) 420
Peak Power Consumption (MW) 126
Lines
LV lines (aerial) (km) 156.53
LV lines (subterranean) (km) 215.69
MV lines (aerial) (km) 38.96
MV lines (subterranean) (km) 66.17
HV lines (aerial) (km) 13.13
HV lines (subterranean) (km) 0
Key
STransmission substation
HV network
MV network
LV network
Figure 23. Graphical representation of base network used to study network
management
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3.7.3 Methodology to study Costs under Passive and Active Management
To model the difference in network costs between passive and active network
management of new technologies, 5 modeling cases were created of which 1 was passive
management (denoted P-1) and 4 were varying degrees of active management (denoted A-1, A-
la, A-2 and A-2a). Table 12 presents summary statistics relating to the new technologies
modeled; more detailed descriptions of the technologies are in the following sections. Table 13
presents a summary of the modelling cases, which are also further detailed in the following
sections of this chapter.
Table 12. Descriptive statistics of new technologies modeled
Total
New Technology Penetration Level Number of
Units
Advanced Metering
Infrastructure (AMI) 100% 66,848(Demand Response (DR) (50-100%)
Programs)
Distributed Generation 33% 22,434(DG)
Electric Vehicles 20% 13,463(EVs)
Table 13. Modeling cases for passive and active management
Case P-1 Case A-1 Case A-la Case A-2 Case A-2a
AMI No demand 50% of 50% of 100% of 100% of
response (DR) consumption consumption consumption consumption
points have points have points have points have
DR with 10% DR with 10% DR with 10% DR with 10%
peak shaving peak shaving peak shaving peak shaving
DG No 50% of DG is 50% of DG is 100% of DG is 100% of DG is
management managed managed managed managed
EVs No 50% of 50% of 100% of 100% of
management; connected EVs connected EVs connected EVs connected EVs
EVs charge have managed have managed have managed have managed
uncoordinated charging charging; charging charging;
Level III Level III
charging charging
spread over 2 spread over 2
hours under hours under
active active
management management
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Passive Management (Case P-1)
In Case P-1, the brownfield model was run assuming that all (100%) of customers had
advanced metering, a randomly chosen 33% (one-third) had distributed generation installations,
and a randomly chosen 20% (one-fifth) had adopted electric vehicles as a mode of transportation.
These technologies were passively managed as described next.
Customers: To model passive management for customers, it was assumed that each
aggregated customer consumption point had a demand profile corresponding in shape to a
normalized power system demand curve. (Owing to the design of the model, it was necessary to
assign profiles to each consumption point rather than to each customer.) To create this curve, a
system demand curve was taken from information made available by the Independent System
Operator of New England (ISO-NE) and normalized to obtain a shape that was applied to all
customers. The curve used is shown in Figure 24.
Figure 24. System hourly demand curve. Source: ISO-NE (2012).
Distributed generation: 33% of customer locations were assumed to have a distributed
generation installation. The distributed generators were defined as solar or CHP generators as
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shown in Table 14. The solar and CHP 9 generation types were selected both to facilitate
modeling and as two of the most likely residential generation technologies connected to the low
voltage network in Germany, the country of the network used for this analysis (KEMA 2011). To
create the 24-hour power generation profiles for distributed generators, a reasonable power
generated per hour was assumed for each type of distributed generation studied. It was assumed
that solar generators could only generate power for 5 consecutive hours between 11 am-6pm. It
was assumed that CHP units could generate power constantly over the 24-hour period, although
such units are likely to generate less power during the summer when their heating component is
unused. Table 14 summarizes the distributed generation data input to the model.
Table 14. DG types and penetration levels
Percentage of Power Hours of
Type total DG units Number generation generation(kW/hour)
Solar 70% 15691 3 5
CHP (incl. biomass, 30% 6743 4 24biogas)
Total 100% 22434
Electric vehicles: 20% of customer locations were assumed to have an electric vehicle
charging point. To model passive management of electric vehicles, it was assumed that
customers charge their vehicles at any convenient time. Data from the US National Household
Travel Survey (NHTS) was used to identify likely charging periods (U.S. Department of
Transportation 2009). Customer charging profiles also depend on the type of charger in use:
Level I chargers draw low voltage and take longer to charge, whereas Level III chargers charge
more quickly at high voltage. The precise charging powers corresponding to each level vary.
Several sources' definitions are presented below.
9 The report finds that solar and biomass installations are two of the most frequently connected installations at low
voltage. It notes the biomass installations are "biomass in cogeneration plants"; cogeneration is also known as CHP.
The CHP is used for the modeling.
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Table 15. Electric vehicle charging power at different charging levels
Society of Automotive
Charging Level EU (MERGE) Engineers (J17772)
standard
Level I 3 kW Up to 1.92 kW
Level H 10-20 kW Up to 19.2 kW
Level III > 40 kW Not yet defined
Sources: Bending, et al. (2010) and MIT (2011).
Customer electric vehicle charging profiles were categorized into one of Level I, II, and
III. 75% of customers were assumed to have a level I charger, 20% a level II charger, and 5% a
level III charger. It was assumed that vehicles began charging in the evening. For Level I
charging, the start time was 7pm; it was felt unreasonable to change this hour because Level I
charging takes 12 hours to complete and vehicles are likely to be needed for travel (and
unavailable for charging) before 7pm and after 7am. For Level II and III charging, the start time
was a randomly selected hour between 1 Opm-3 am. These hours were selected because according
to 2009 data from the NHTS, the period between 1 Opm-6am contains the fewest number of trip
starts so is the most likely period when vehicles are available to be charged. To acknowledge the
minimum time required to fully charge a vehicle, the cutoff time for starting a charge was set to
3am rather than 6am. Table 16 summarizes the electric vehicle data input to the model.
Table 16. EV penetration levels and charging levels
Percentage of Power demand Hours to fullCharging Level total EV units Number (kW/hour) charge
Level I 75% 9462 3 12
Level I 20% 3330 15 3
Level II 5% 671 40 (20 in cases 1 (2 in casesA-la, A-2a) A-la, A-2a)
Total 100% 13463
Active Management (Cases A-1, A-la, A-2 and A-2a)
The capacity of the model to evaluate hourly demand (or generation) profiles was utilized
to model two different degrees of active network management. In case A-1, 50% of the
connected new technologies were actively managed and in case A-2, 100% of the connected new
technologies were actively managed. Two additional cases denoted case A-la and case A-2a
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were run later where the active management of Level III EV charging was modified, as
explained below.
Customers: To model active management for customers, it was decided to use peak
shaving to simulate demand response (DR) of customers to the total system power demand. First,
the power demand curves used for the passive management case were analyzed. The peak hour
and valley hour were identified, and the 2 hours on either side of the peak and valley hour were
also selected. This resulted in a 5-hour peak demand period, and a 5-hour valley demand period.
To generate the active demand curves, 10% of the demand from the peak periods was shaved and
added to the valley demand periods. The resulting active demand profiles were assigned to the
customers who previously had the corresponding passive demand profiles. 50% of customers had
active management in cases A-I and A-Ia, and 100% of customers had active management in
cases A-2 and A-2a.
Distributed generation: To model active management for solar units, it was assumed that
the utility had some control over the generator and could shift generation output to a 5-hour
period between 12pm-9pm, through a combination of storage and management. For CHP units,
the power profiles were modified to output at their maximum level during 12pm-9pm and a
corresponding amount less during all other hours. The total power generated by each unit over
the 24-hour period remained the same. 50% of all distributed generation units had active
management in cases A-I and A-la and 100% of units had active management in cases A-2 and
A-2a.
Electric vehicles: To model active management for electric vehicles, it was assumed that
the utility could stagger Level II and III charging start times over 1 lpm-5am for Level II and
12am-5am for Level III. The vehicle charging profiles were modified by time-shifting them to
the appropriate time period and randomizing their start times so that fewer vehicles began
charging simultaneously. The total power demanded by each vehicle over the 24-hour period
remained the same. 50% of all electric vehicles had their charging actively managed in case A-I
and 100% of vehicles had their charging actively managed in case A-2.
Following an examination of preliminary results, it was decided to investigate the
management of Level III charging further to check the effect of the high 40 kW power demand
of Level III charging on the results. Instead of merely time-shifting Level III charging to valley
demand hours, the Level III charging was time-shifted, the power consumption per hour of Level
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III chargers was halved to 20 kW and charging took place over 2 hours instead of 1 hour. This
change was applied to the electric vehicles with Level III charging in case A-1 (50% penetration
of electric vehicles) and the resulting case was denoted A-Ia. Similarly, the change was applied
to the electric vehicles with Level III charging in case A-2 (100% penetration of electric vehicles)
and the resulting case was denoted A-2a.
3.7.4 Results
Results are presented for the active and passive management cases studied.
Table 17. Comparison of investment costs required under passive and
management cases A-I and A-2
active network
Network Investment Costs for P-1, A-1 and A-2 (euros) Savings vs. P-1
(%)
Component Netiork P-1 A-1 A-2 A-1 A-2
LV wires 10,108,054 4,289,635 2,969,005 3,266,111 31 24
MV-LV substations 4,014,400 1,986,600 1,227,800 1,440,600 38 27
MV wires 7,235,973 1,424,508 650,785 650,785 54 54
HV-MV substations 8,120,000 2,800,000 2,800,000 2,800,000 0 0
HV wires 577,645 0 0 0 0 0
Total 30,056,072 10,500,743 7,647,590 8,157,496 27.17% 22.32%
Note: The "Initial Network" column provides the investment costs of the initial network, as a
reference.
Table 18. Comparison of investment costs required under passive and active
network management cases A-i a and A-2a
Network Investment Costs for P-1, A-ia and A-2a (euros)
Component Netiork P-1 A-ia A-2a
LV wires 10,108,054 4,289,635 2,813,113 2,845,865
MV-LV substations 4,014,400 1,986,600 1,227,800 1,401,600
MV wires 7,235,973 1,424,508 650,785 708,983
HV-MV substations 8,120,000 2,800,000 2,800,000 2,800,000
HV wires 577,645 0 0 0
Total 30,056,072 10,500,743 7,491,698 7,756,448
Note: The "Initial Network" column provides the investment costs of the initial
network, as a reference.
116
Table 19. Comparison of new lines required
Additional Lines Required
Line P-1 A-1 A-2
LV lines (aerial) (km) 81.07 60.68 64.82
LV lines (subterranean) (km) 73.9 45.99 52.8
MV lines (aerial) (km) 15.02 9.39 9.39
MV lines (subterranean) (km) 9.72 3.92 3.92
Table 20. Comparison of number of new substations/transformers required
Additional Substations/Transformers Required
Vnomi Vnom2 Nominal P-1 A-1 A-2(kV) (kV) Power (kVA)
66 20 38000 2 2 2
20 0.4 810 150 93 108
20 0.4 290 3 2 3
20 0.4 110 1 0 1
Note: Vnom refers to the nominal voltage of the substation or transformer.
Table 21. Comparison of total investment costs for all cases
Total Investment Costs
Case P-1 A-1 A-2
Total
Investment
Costs 10,500,743 100.00% 7,647,590 72.83% 8,157,496 77.68%
(Percentage of
Case P-1)
Case A-la A-2a
Total
Investment
Costs 7,491,698 71.34% 7,756,448 73.87%
(Percentage of
Case P-1)
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Figure 25. Investment costs under passive and active network management, broken down
by network component
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Figure 26. The incremental wires network required (in addition to the base network) for cases P-I and A-2. Note: Wires in each
case are color coded by their investment cost. A darker color indicates a higher-cost wire (relative to other wires built for that
case).
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Figure 27. Net power demand of customers and electric vehicles less power contributions from
distributed generation, for cases P-1, A-I and A-2.
3.7.5 Discussion
It can be seen that the benefits of active management are fairly significant. In the low
voltage network (LV wires and MV-LV substations), active management cases A-1 and A-2
translate into savings of between 24-38% compared to the passive management case: that is,
component costs are 24-38% less than under passive management as shown in Table 17. For the
medium voltage network, the savings are the same, 54% for both actively managed cases. It is
likely that the similarity occurs because as the voltage level of network components increases,
the investments required are increasingly lumpy so the differences between the two forms of
management are less clear. For example, as shown in Table 20, 2 incremental 66 kV-20 kV (HV-
MV) substations are required for the network built in all cases analyzed so there is no HV-MV
substation cost difference between passive and active cases. However, there is a difference in the
number of 20 kV-0.4 kV (MV-LV) substations required which translates to a difference in MV-
LV substation costs under active management compared to passive management.
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Table 17 and Figure 25 show how case A-1 with only 50% of the customers and new
technologies actively managed, results in a lower overall network investment cost than case A-2
with 100% of customers and new technologies actively managed. This network investment cost
is largely determined by the peak power demand in the network when the net power demands in
all 24 hours are analyzed by the model. Figure 27 superimposes the power demands in all 24
hours for cases A-I and A-2 on the power demands for case P-1. In case A-1, the peak occurs in
hour 21 (9pm) and is driven by Level II and III electric vehicle charging since under this 50%
actively managed case, only 50% of electric vehicles have charging times shifted. In case A-2,
100% of vehicles had their charging times shifted to nighttime and because of the high power
demands of electric vehicle chargers, the peak occurs in hour 1 (lam).
Active management was investigated further with particular attention paid to Level III
electric vehicle charging because of the extremely high 40 kW power demand per hour under
Level III charging. In cases A-la and A-2a, the Level III chargers' power demand was reduced
to 20 kW per hour and the total time allowed for charging was doubled to 2 hours. Table 18
shows the detailed results for cases A-la and A-2a while Table 21 compares the costs to those
under cases P-1, A-1, and A-2. Although case A-la continues to produce a lower network
investment cost than case A-2a, the percentage difference in investment cost between case A-la
and case A-2a is small, 3.53%. The corresponding difference between case A-1 and case A-2 is
6.67%. This result illustrates the importance of active management design and implementation
processes. If active management is implemented by only time-shifting the demand, without
spreading it over a greater number of hours, the different technologies and customer power
demands may interact in such a way that the net peak power demand is still fairly high in a fully
actively managed network. If enough customers are indifferent to the total time taken to charge
their vehicles at night, even fast chargers that have a very high power demand could be actively
managed in sophisticated ways so as to reduce their peak power demand and reduce the power
demands on the network. It may be that Level III chargers' power demand can be reduced to
even lower than 20 kW per hour and those vehicles' charging times spread throughout the night,
which would change the effect of EV chargers on net power demand even more. Finally, on the
one hand the results suggest that many of the benefits of active management may be captured by
a network that has 50% active management. On the other hand, a 100% actively managed
network may see additional benefits that a 50% actively managed network does not. For example,
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a network with loads and generation fully manageable by the distribution company may be
quicker to respond to emergencies or sudden changes in network conditions.
The benefits of actively managed case A-2 relative to passively managed case P-1 are
largest in the MV wires network. For example, as Table 19 shows, under case A-2 the required
length of underground MV lines was less than half of the requirement under case P-1. The
graphical representation of the P-1 and A-2 networks in Figure 26 also shows that under active
management (A-2), several lines that were required under passive management (P-1) are no
longer built. The visual density of the lines is higher in P-1 compared to A-2, reflecting the fact
that more lines are required in P-I than in A-2.
In general, the results demonstrate the benefits of active management compared to
passive management in terms of required network investment costs. The differences in the two
active management cases studied also illustrate the importance of design and implementation of
active management programs.
3.7.6 Methodology to study Losses under Passive and Active Management
Losses were also compared for a passive management case and an active management
case. In order to make the networks comparable for the purpose of studying losses, a different
methodology was applied to the analysis of losses.
In step 1, the base network was created using the greenfield model as described in section
3.7.2. In step 2, the brownfield model was run to obtain results for the passively managed
network. Losses are affected by transformer taps since the model normally varies the taps to
change the output power of the transformers. To make losses in different cases comparable, the
taps should be fixed in both cases so that they do not affect losses. Hence in step 3, the
brownfield model was run again on the results of step 2, with passively managed power flows
and transformer taps fixed. The results of step 3 provide an indication of losses costs.
To study losses in an actively managed network, it was necessary to prevent the model
from planning a different network to meet the requirements of the active case. The networks
planned above to study investment costs for the passive case P-1 and the active case A-2 are
materially different in terms of their configurations, components, and equipment. While this is an
expected result owing to the different demands of active and passive management, it was felt that
distribution line losses in two essentially different networks should not be compared directly.
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Hence, to study losses under active management, the passively managed network was
obtained from step 2 as described above. In step 3 the brownfield model was run again on this
network but with actively managed power flows and transformer taps fixed. That is, the
underlying network was that created for passive management but the power flows were those of
an actively managed network.
3.7.7 Results
Results were obtained using the methods described above for losses and are tabulated in
Table 22. As the unit cost of losses is a discretionary parameter in this model, for this close
examination of losses it is considered more useful to present the kWh of losses calculated by the
model for the first year of the network. Owing to the need to keep the underlying network
configuration consistent and transformer taps fixed in both cases in order to compare losses, the
networks are not precisely the same as the P-1 and A-2 networks planned by the model during
the study of investment costs, so they are not labeled as P-1 and A-2. However, in terms of
network management approaches, the passive case for which losses were studied broadly
corresponds to the fully passively managed case P-1 and the active case broadly corresponds to
the fully actively managed case A-2.
Table 22. Losses under passive and active management
Passive Active kWh of losses in active
Component management management case as percentage of
(kWh) (kWh) passive case (%)
LV wires 1,527,984 1,005,344 65.80
MV-LV substations 271,113 217,459 80.21
MV wires 345,859 219,806 63.55
HV-MV substations 136,452 113,777 83.38
HV wires 65,573 41,354 63.07
3.7.8 Discussion
The benefits of active management can also be seen in the cost of losses. By reducing the
peak utilization of network components, active management generally mitigates losses. The cost
of losses is lower under active than under passive management for all network components
studied.
The benefit is clearest in the wires network at all voltage levels, with active management
implying a cost of losses that is between 63-66% of the cost under passive management. The
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benefits of active management in substations are not as large, as costs are 80-83% of those under
passive management. For the network studied, the reason for this could be that the substations in
the base network already have a very high level of capacity utilization. Thus, when the
brownfield model plans network expansion for demand growth and new technology integration,
the need for the substations to operate even closer to capacity to meet the new requirements
reduces scope for cost reduction through reducing losses.
3.7.9 Comment on Base Network Capacity and Incremental Investment Required
As described in Section 3.7.2, the cases for passive management and 100% active
management were also run using an idealized base network created by the greenfield model. The
results are presented in Table 23. The incremental investment required for passive and active
management is significantly higher for substation components than for the LV or MV feeders.
The smaller required investment in feeders is because the idealized base network already has
significant spare capacity designed into its LV and MV feeders. The greenfield model designs
this spare capacity into the base network because of the high cost of losses set as an input
parameter, implying the need for a network with sufficient spare capacity to mitigate losses.
When the brownfield model is run using a base network with such high spare capacity, it results
in a smaller required investment in feeders since the base network's feeders have sufficient spare
capacity to accommodate the increment in demand.
Table 23. Results for passive and active management when the brownfield model is run
on an idealized base network
P-1 (ideal base network) A-2 (ideal base network)
Incremental Incremental
investment investment
Incremental costs as Incremental costs as
Component Investment percentage Investment percentage
costs (euros) of base costs (euros) of base
network network
costs (%) costs (%)
LV wires 1,372,240 12.69 659,070 6.08
MV-LV substations 2,220,600 55.61 1,707,800 42.77
MV wires 275,362 3.93 88,395 1.26
HV-MV substations 2,800,000 34.48 2,800,000 34.48
Although the initial network used in this case is viewed as an idealized base network that
is less approximate to reality, the benefits of active management versus passive management are
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still apparent in the results. Active management results in a lower required investment cost in LV
wires, MV-LV substations, MV wires, and HV-MV substations as it reduces the peak power
demand in the network.
3.7.10 Conclusions from Modeling Analyses
The results of the greenfield and brownfield models show the necessary network
investment costs for various new technology penetration scenarios and new technology
management scenarios. For distributed generation, investment costs depend on the location and
per-unit power output of the distributed generators. Costs display a trend of decreasing and then
increasing as penetration increases for DG located near to customers with a power output of 3
kW/unit. However, costs do not change so markedly as DG penetration increases when the DG is
located near to customers and has a very low per-unit power output. Nor do they change so
markedly as DG power output increases when the DG is located far away from customers.
The brownfield model clearly demonstrates the benefits of active network management
of new technologies, and additionally shows the importance of design and implementation of
active network management programs. Active management generally implies a decrease in LV
and MV distribution network investment costs relative to passive management. Depending how
active management is implemented, active management of 50% of the new technologies may not
give very different results to active management of 100% of new technologies especially if the
peak power flows are not very different.
In the presence of new technologies like those studied here, regulatory schemes to
remunerate distribution companies for their costs need to be designed appropriately to take into
account the changes in costs under different scenarios as illustrated by the modeling results.
Otherwise distribution companies may be over- or under-compensated, and will not make the
investments needed to accommodate new technologies in an efficient way. Once companies'
allowed revenue (amount of remuneration) has been determined, the costs need to be allocated to
and recovered from network users. The following chapter considers the linked issues of
remuneration, cost allocation and cost recovery in the presence of new technologies.
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Chapter 4: Remuneration, Cost Allocation
and Recovery
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4.1 Existing Methods of Cost Allocation and Recovery
After the appropriate changes to a distribution company's allowed revenue have been
established (for example with the aid of modeling analyses) to compensate for capital
investments related to accommodating new technologies, the allowed revenue has to be raised
from network users through appropriate tariffs. To achieve this, regulators need to allocate the
costs between network users, and devise a consistent mechanism (tariff) for charging each group
of users so as to recover the costs.
In the US under cost of service regulation, a particularly diverse set of judgments has
been made with regard to cost recovery. Utilities install many of these new technologies through
one-time projects developed for their installation, which are proposed to the relevant regulatory
commission for approval. The proposals approved so far have employed a diverse set of cost
recovery mechanisms. The mechanism selected for cost recovery is important because if well
designed, it can permit an appropriate level of risk sharing and may reduce the risk of cost
overruns.
Several studies of smart grid project cost recovery methods to date have compiled a
variety of cost recovery approaches. Some common approaches are summarized in Table 24.
Table 24. Some cost recovery methods
Mechanism Description
Rate Base The most basic form of cost recovery allows utilities to recover their costs by adding
the cost to the rate base, which is the basis for how customer charges are determined.
Rate base cost recovery can be partial (only part of the project costs are recovered
through modifications to the rate base) or deferred (cost recovery approved, but exact
formulations deferred - for example till the next base rate case).
Tariff rider A rider formula (that calculates an amount in $/kWh) is added to the base electricity
tariff to recover costs specific to that project and can be trued-up regularly to account
for over or under-recovery.
Costs plus The utility can be compensated for a demand response program by the program cost
avoided cost plus an amount related to the amount it saves from not investing in additional
(DR) generation capacity. The additional amount serves as an incentive.
Surcharge A fixed surcharge amount in $ can be added monthly or annually to bills to cover the
with/without project costs. A tracker tracks the project-related costs and allows the surcharge to be
Tracker reset on a periodic basis to adjust for ongoing changes in costs. The surcharge is
Mechanism similar to a tariff rider, but a surcharge is a preset dollar amount while a rider may be
implemented as a formula.
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Table 24. (continued)
External Regulators can require that part or all of the capital costs of a project be funded by
funding specific funding pots set aside for grid modernization. Examples of such pots include
the Smart Grid Investment Grants in the US and the Low Carbon Networks fund in
the UK.
Sources: Based on information in KEMA (2011), Edison Electric Institute (2005), MIT (2011),
and EnerNOC (2009).
In cost of service regulation, regulatory opinions over the type of cost recovery to
approve differ across states. One of the principal reasons BGE's advanced metering project was
rejected by the Maryland PUC was its proposed cost recovery mechanism - a surcharge. The
PUC objected to this because of its implications for risk allocation: "BGE's Proposal... also is a
request to establish a customer surcharge for advance recovery of the costs of the Proposal,
thereby shifting all financial risk to BGE customers" (Public Service Commission of Maryland
2010, 3). But in Texas, surcharges have been approved for CenterPoint Energy and Oncor
Electric Delivery's advanced metering projects (Edison Electric Institute 2009). Whereas the
Maryland PUC considers BGE's advanced metering project "classic utility infrastructure
investment that should be recovered through distribution rates", the Texas PUC finds Oncor's
AMS Surcharge Model "a reasonable method", approves it and then affirms "If the Commission
conducts a general base rate proceeding related to Oncor's base rates during the AMS
deployment period (2008 - 2012), then Oncor will not seek to include the costs of the AMS in
base rates" although the decision also allows for future base rate cost recovery for meters
installed in addition to those in the AMS project (Public Utility Commission of Texas 2008, 5, 7,
Public Service Commission of Maryland 2010, 4).
Another cost allocation issue for regulators is that when benefits are difficult to quantify
and allocate, it is more difficult to decide who should pay for the project. For example, projects
may produce public benefits such as pollution mitigation and climate change mitigation that are
not only difficult to quantify but also accrue to customers outside the project utility's service
territory. But the project itself has to be cost and paid for by a group of investors and ratepayers
that does not include all those who benefit from it.
The benefits of many new technologies are also inherently uncertain. It may be desirable
to allocate the costs to the customers likely to benefit from the new technologies. But the benefits
of certain types of investments such as AMI investments may depend on uncertain external
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factors such as customer behaviors, dynamic pricing problems, and government policies, making
it hard to decide how, at the outset, to allocate costs fairly.
4.2 Remuneration, Cost Allocation and Recovery for Distributed
Generation
The following discussion pertains to residential, small-scale distributed generation often
installed at residential customer locations. The case of distributed generation is particularly
interesting owing to the remuneration, cost allocation and cost recovery methods that have been
implemented for it to date. As one of the more mature technologies studied here, DG can provide
valuable lessons on appropriate regulatory principles in the presence of new technologies. As
determining allowed revenue (remuneration) for integrating DG is closely linked to problems in
cost allocation and recovery, all three issues are discussed below.
In the US, a number of states have implemented net metering for small-scale distributed
generation facilities with power outputs below certain levels. This may distort incentives for
distribution companies because as described in Chapter 1, a common means of recovering
distribution network costs in the US is volumetric energy charges. Distribution companies charge
customers based on the amount of energy they consume. Under net metering, the volumetric
charge then depends on the net amount of energy consumed. Hence net metering combined with
volumetric remuneration make distribution companies unfavorably disposed towards
technologies or measures (such as distributed generation or energy efficiency programs) that
reduce the amount of energy distributed by them to be consumed by customers. For energy
efficiency, a wide range of regulatory modifications such as decoupling, lost revenue adjustment,
or energy efficiency program-specific cost recovery (among other methods) have been used to
mitigate this disincentive (EnerNOC 2009, Environmental Protection Agency 2007, MIT 2011).
Nevertheless, this disincentive on the part of distribution companies towards energy usage
reduction applies to many other measures besides energy efficiency and will only grow more
acute with the introduction of technologies like DG that can reduce energy consumption.
A second, related issue that complicates cost allocation and recovery is that residential
distribution grid customers in the US, unlike some other countries, generally do not have a
"contracted power capacity" (kW) with their distribution companies since revenue collected is
determined by total amount (kWh) of energy consumed. Not knowing the capacity (kW) of
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energy that customers are utilizing makes it difficult to know how this capacity, and so network
costs, would be affected by distributed generation. In turn, this makes it more difficult to allocate
costs for distributed generation among the network customers.
Thirdly, determining allowed revenue and cost allocation for small-scale DG have
become more problematic with the introduction of net metering as a system of remuneration for
DG. In areas such as the US state of Massachusetts, net metering allows customers with
qualifying DG installations to pay only for the net electricity they consume (Commonwealth of
Massachusetts 2008). As the public FAQ relating to net metering in Massachusetts explicitly
states, "If net consumption is positive, customer pays electricity bill. If net consumption is
negative, customer receives credit on electricity bill" (Commonwealth of Massachusetts 2012).
However, under this system, customers with DG installations contribute less to the cost of the
distribution network than customers without DG installations. In fact, since every kWh generated
is offset against the electricity bill, every kWh generated avoids paying electricity distribution
charges. Yet customers with DG installations still utilize the distribution network since the
generators are connected to the network, are part of the entire network circuit, and cannot be
viewed in isolation. Whenever a DG unit is generating, the connected DG unit charges electrons
in the distribution network it is connected to and transfers energy through the network. The
power generated by DG therefore makes use of the distribution network, and should incur
appropriate network costs.
DG installations may even add to distribution network costs when the DG units utilize
wind or solar energy that do not generate electricity consistently, necessitating operational
changes or investments in equipment or control systems to manage the ensuing current and/or
voltage fluctuations. Customers wishing to sell excess electricity generated by their DG
installations back to the grid may also add to network management costs. Furthermore in the
presence of DG, the existing grid network provides a useful source of reliable backup power for
cases when DG is not available to generate power. It can also provide cheaper power when the
power generated by DG is too expensive. Such features are benefits which the distribution
company should be compensated for.
Net metering thus raises the possibility of inadequate remuneration. If net metering
combined with volumetric remuneration is in use, in the long run as more customers install DG
units or increase the power output of their DG units, the amount of money recovered from
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customers will decrease. But for the reasons described above and as the modeling results of
Chapter 3 show, DG-related costs do not always decrease as DG penetration level increases. In
fact the modeling results suggest costs can take an upward trend at higher customer penetration
levels. This is to say nothing of the costs of maintaining the aforementioned services that the
network provides to DG-owning customers, such as backup power, reliability, and an acceptable
level of network quality of service. Also for these reasons decoupling revenues from energy
consumption, which has been used to ensure revenue recovery in the presence of energy
efficiency programs, is not likely to be a sufficient regulatory solution for DG. Decoupling may
work to mitigate disincentives to energy efficiency programs that simply reduce demand for
electricity without necessarily adding to distribution companies' costs. But unlike energy
efficiency programs, DG technologies inject power into the network and imply network capacity
and management requirements - and so, costs - for the distribution company.
Net metering can also cause inequity issues in cost allocation. In the long run, faced with
the additional costs of integrating DG, the distribution company may attempt to recover its
additional costs from other customers who do not have net metered DG installations and who
cannot offset generation against consumption. By allowing customers with qualifying distributed
generation installations to receive a credit for their generation, net metering causes customers
without such installations to subsidize the cost of the distribution network for customers with
installations (MIT 2011, 182-183).
Net metering may have been introduced to indirectly encourage distributed generation by
decreasing customers' energy costs, measured on a per-kWh basis. However, owing to net
metering's drawbacks, it is not an effective subsidy. The inequity of the cross-subsidies among
customers with and without DG caused by net metering is not economically efficient and in the
long run net metering can prevent adequate cost recovery for distribution networks. If it is
desired to subsidize DG to encourage more DG connections to the network, an explicit subsidy
such as feed-in tariffs is arguably preferable to the implicit subsidy of net metering.
4.2.1 Approaches to Remuneration and Cost Recovery
Several methods have been proposed to recover DG-specific costs, such as connection
and use of system charges. Connection charges are paid by the generator to the network for
connecting to the system. They are a one-time payment made at first connection. They can be
shallow (the distribution company is paid for the direct cost of connection), deep (the company is
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paid for the cost of connection and network reinforcements), or shallowish (a mixture of the two
methods) (Cossent, G6mez and Frias 2009, Frias, G6mez and Rivier 2008). Bauknecht and
Brunekreeft note that deep charging can be unfair to different DG, since the cost of connection
and network reinforcements and the transaction costs of negotiation between DG and the
distribution company differs for each DG, while shallow charging "does not internalize the
external costs and benefits" (2008, 494). A mix of deep and shallow charging may also be used
to reflect different connection costs of different types of generators, as in the Netherlands and the
UK (where deep charges are permitted when the cost of integrating DG exceeds E200/kW)
(Cossent, Frias and G6mez 2008, Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) 2009). Use of
system charges are paid periodically by network users, and in current practice in Europe they
may or may not be paid by DG (Cossent, G6mez and Frias 2009). Use of system charges for DG
can be made dependent on the DG's voltage level, location, or other metrics. This could allow a
regulator to allocate higher costs to distributed generators that are more expensive to integrate
into the system, making for more efficient cost allocation. These means of cost allocation and
recovery may make distribution companies neutral regarding connecting DG to their networks,
or even incentivize them to do so.
The EU's 2007 DG-GRID study by Scheepers, et al. (2007) suggests shallow connection
charges to reduce the cost of DG connections and encourage DG to connect to the network. To
cover ongoing integration and operation costs of DG, Scheepers, et al. (2007) and Frias, G6mez
and Rivier (2008) suggest use of system charges differentiated by time-of-use. Scheepers, et al.
(2007) suggest that use of system charges also be made dependent on location, since the cost of
DG integration depends on the location of the DG within the network. Finally, Frias, G6mez, and
Rivier (2008) suggest use of system charges also be dependent on the voltage level of the DG
connection.
Other methods of cost recovery include revenue driver incentives outside the revenue
control, or even setting the revenue or price cap to account for the cost of DG connections so
DG-related costs may be recovered from generators or network users. An example of an
incentive is the revenue driver in the UK that automatically remunerates the distribution
company per kW of DG connected, as described in Chapter 2. The cost of the incentive is
recovered from network users but using a cost-reflective methodology to recover an appropriate
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proportion from demand and from generation (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem)
2009).
In some states in the US, the regulatory framework permits standby rates to be levied on
certain distributed generation facilities, generally large ones with a power output above a certain
level. Standby rates establish tariffs that charge DG owners for the costs of providing them with
backup power when their DG does not generate enough power to fully serve them. Depending on
their design, these rates may partially address the problem of cost recovery for DG-related costs.
However, as the name implies, standby rates are intended to remunerate the grid for providing
"standby" or backup service to generators. They may not provide sufficient remuneration for the
network capacity expansion, power management systems, or other features that may be needed
to accommodate DG. For example if the rates are designed to take effect only when the DG does
not generate, they remunerate for network backup service costs but not for capacity additions
that may be needed to accommodate the total power output by many DG units, and not for the
network management costs implied when the DG-generated power injected to the grid has to be
managed to balance the network and avoid deteriorations in service quality.
It is also important to note that first, according to a review by Environmental Protection
Agency standby rates mostly apply to generators defined to have larger capacities than the
smaller residential units considered in this study (Environmental Protection Agency 2009) but
smaller units will become more important as the penetration of residential DG increases. Second,
DG eligible for net metering may be exempted from standby rates as in North Carolina and as in
the Southern California Edison service territory, meaning such standby rates cannot help to
resolve cost recovery problems with net metering (U.S. Department of Energy 2012, Southern
California Edison 2009). Third, the use and design of standby rates vary greatly across states and
between companies in the same state so there is not a consistent method in use. Standby rates
may also be provided on a case-by-case basis via negotiations between the generator and
distribution company, which implies transaction costs of negotiation. Such an implementation of
standby rates would not be very effective for residential distributed generators, since there would
likely be many more units of small residential generators than there are large generators and it
would be inefficient to negotiate each small generator's contract separately.
In the US, recent proposals to remedy net metering cross-subsidization and inadequate
remuneration for networks accommodating residential DG have seen regulators take opposite
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views. In California, SDG&E proposed a network use charge to charge customers based on their
use of the network (Earl and Barnes 2011). Such a use-based charge would have collected
payments from DG owners for their use of the network during DG generation. The proposal was
rejected in part because the lawfulness of differentiating between customers with and without
DG was questioned (California Public Utilities Commission 2012). On the other hand in
Virginia, the commission approved a "standby charge" for DG between 10 kW and 20 kW,
acknowledging that "customer-generators who engage in net metering still make use of the
transmission and distribution grid" and that the benefits from their DG alone were insufficient to
remunerate the distribution company (State Corporation Commission, Commonwealth of
Virginia 2011, 3). Strictly speaking, the Virginia "standby charge" does not appear to resemble
standby rates that are levied only when the DG has an outage and requires power from the
network. The "standby charge" approved provides for a fixed sum per month and does not
mention making the levy conditional on a DG outage (State Corporation Commission,
Commonwealth of Virginia 2011). However, a news report noted that the power output
eligibility criteria for the standby charge was set so high that only one customer was found to be
liable for it in 2011, suggesting that remuneration for smaller-scale residential DG has yet to be
addressed fully (Lillian 2011).
4.2.2 Proposals to Remunerate for and Recover Network Costs in the Presence of DG
In the US, shifting away from volumetric remuneration would remove a disincentive to
the connection and use of DG. The decoupling process that has been used in several states to
remove disincentives to energy efficiency is a step towards this end, although current
implementations do not acknowledge the added costs implied by DG units generating power.
One form of decoupling that removes the disincentive to connect DG could be to impose lump
sum capacity charges based on historical energy use patterns. While the initial charge amount
could be based on a historical analysis of energy used, the charging structure thenceforth should
be made completely independent of changes in future energy usage to avoid the present
disincentives arising again. Such a method should also include a small volumetric charge
component so that network users retain some incentive to conserve energy.
To ensure that customers with distributed generators pay a fair share of the network costs
they are responsible for, net metering should be reformed. One method of doing this could
involve the installation of two meters, one measuring all energy consumed and the other
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measuring all energy generated. The principles of net metering could be applied by charging an
energy charge based on net consumption (the difference between the two meter readings).
However, then, an additional capacity charge should be imposed. As mentioned above, a key
problem with volumetric charges is that they can allow DG to avoid paying network costs.
Capacity charges resolve this issue. This charge could be based on the maximum power
generated or consumed, as measured by the meters. Network expansion costs (investments in
larger feeders, transformers, etc.) are largely driven by the peak power transmitted in the network,
so a capacity charge linked to the maximum power generated or consumed is an elegant solution.
Another method of reforming DG cost recovery could take advantage of the sophisticated
hourly metering features of advanced metering infrastructure. Two tariffs could be designed, one
for generation and one for consumption. Both would incorporate the need to pay for network
costs. The advanced meter would record whether net generation or consumption occurred in a
given hour. The appropriate tariff would then be applied to that hour. This system would result in
a measurement of net demand and a second measurement of net generation as shown in Figure
28. The tariff for demand might incorporate both capacity and quantity demanded charges to
recover costs (that is, be a two-part tariff). Similarly, the tariff for generation might incorporate
both capacity and quantity generated charges. If the peak value of net generation was very small
relative to the peak value of net demand (as it is in the example of Figure 28), the capacity
charge would be determined by the maximum capacity required to meet demand and be paid
through the demand tariff. Then the capacity charge for generation would be zero. In a sense, this
is an economically elegant solution as the capacity charge is tied to the type of network usage
(demand or generation) which drives the need for network capacity.
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Figure 28. Theoretical generation and consumption and the application of two tariffs
In the context of transmission cost allocation, it has been proposed that the costs of new
lines be divided into two components (Perez-Arriaga and Olmos 2009, 15). The first cost
component would be "allocated to the network users (both generators and loads) according to
their responsibility in the construction of the line", and the remaining component of cost would
be allocated to the final beneficiaries of lines, generally the customers (15-16). In distribution,
when the penetration level of distributed generation is high enough, it may be valuable to
consider similar methods of cost allocation.
More advanced methods of cost recovery via connection and use of system charges may
also be considered. For example, different connection charges may be levied on DG generators
depending on their time of connection to the network to pay for the costs the distribution
company incurs because of those generators (such as new lines that have to be built as a result of
the new DG connections). Existing users of the network, who do not precipitate the building of
those new lines, should contribute relatively less towards their cost. A similar principle is
advanced in Perez-Arriaga and Olmos (2009), for transmission.
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Ex ante DG charges are another possible method of cost recovery. As the modeling
results of Chapter 3 show, network costs caused by some types of residential DG connections are
expected to decrease at first, but then increase as DG penetration increases. If DG connections
are forecast to increase in future to a level that increases network costs, DG generators now
connecting to the network could be required to pay charges determined ex ante that take into
account the expected future costs. The fee schedule could be pre-set to increase each year as the
amount of DG in the network is forecast to grow. By confronting DG with ex ante charges
dependent on forecast DG connections in the area, this method also allows a locational signal to
be sent. DG is incentivized to install in areas with less DG, where the forecast level of
connections grows at a slower rate and the ex ante charges are less.
Finally, Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP) has been used in transmission to provide
short-term price signals to network users depending on the congestion and demand in the
network at that point in time. A similar concept applied to distribution would pay DG more when
a network has a high power demand, as DG (particularly when located near to customers) would
help meet that demand. Since this pricing concept depends on the state of the network at that
point in time, no additional pricing signals are required. However, it requires a sophisticated
network system capable of calculating the price at different nodes on the distribution system. The
modernization of the distribution system may increase network visibility and control to a point
where such a system is feasible.
4.3 Remuneration, Cost Allocation and Recovery for Other New
Technologies
Other new technologies such as electric vehicles and advanced metering infrastructure
also necessitate appropriate cost allocation and recovery. Although the problems of each new
technology differ, some of the ideas advanced with respect to DG may be of use. For example,
electric vehicles may someday contribute electricity to the network via Vehicle-to-Grid systems
and it will be necessary to avoid the net metering problems seen when remunerating for
distributed generation that contributes electricity to the network. More likely in the near future is
that electric vehicles require investments in network capacity owing to the high power demands
of Level II and III charging. As seen in the results for active and passive management scenarios
in Chapter 3, the capacity demands of Level III chargers can have a large effect on network costs.
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To ensure the distribution company is adequately remunerated for these costs, a capacity charge
similar to that proposed for DG can help recover the costs from electric vehicle owners.
In the following concluding chapter, the regulatory proposals considered in Chapter 2, the
results from the modeling analyses in Chapter 3, and the cost allocation and recovery issues
discussed in Chapter 4 are synthesized to select and develop appropriate regulatory proposals for
regulating distribution companies' allowed revenue in the presence of new technologies.
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Chapter 5: Regulatory Proposals
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5.1 Regulation for the Future
Two key questions for future distribution grid regulation are: what should the regulatory
scheme itself look like, and how should any additional regulatory incentives be utilized to
stimulate the adoption and optimal integration of new technologies?
New technologies such as distributed generation (DG), distribution automation and
electric vehicles among others are increasingly connecting to distribution networks. The
introduction of these technologies is given impetus by new objectives such as improving
environmental sustainability by utilizing distributed renewable generation, and modernizing the
grid by utilizing technologies that enable better management and control of the grid. As
described in Chapter 2, many new technologies create challenges for distribution regulation in
terms of regulating the necessary capital investment, accommodating lost revenue recovery (in
some cases), regulating network performance and regulating innovation.
To meet these challenges incentive regulatory schemes are moving towards an outputs-
based framework, with associated incentives targeting the introduction of new technologies or
the implementation of innovative projects. An outputs-based framework to a degree permits
companies to decide how to deploy and use new technologies provided a set of output targets
(for example, relating to network reliability) are met, which opens up innovative potential in
network design and use. As the regulatory scheme is the framework within which specific
incentives such as distributed generation incentives operate, it is important to consider the
interactions between the scheme and incentives in the design of regulation.
In places in the US, cost of service regulatory schemes have adopted some of the features
of outputs-based incentive regulation via the introduction of targets for losses and quality of
service. The California PUC's interest in the development of metrics for assessing grid
modernization points to potential measures that might be used to regulate network outputs.
The new regulatory schemes are not powerful enough, by themselves, to facilitate the
optimal penetration and operation of new technologies without specific incentives. Countries
which have introduced or considered new outputs-based regulatory schemes have often
accompanied them with regulatory incentives intended to stimulate adoption and, increasingly,
the optimal use of the new technologies. Such incentives may provide added support for
distributed generation connections or investment in innovative network projects.
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In the design of incentives for specific technologies, it is vital to consider the goal of the
incentive. If the goal is simply to increase the number of DG units that the distribution company
connects to its network, a simple and elegant revenue driver that provides some revenue for each
connection may work. If the goal is to encourage the distribution company to utilize and manage
the electricity generated by DG to meet demand for power and ancillary services in an efficient
and environmentally sustainable manner (an implementation of active network management),
then a revenue driver that rewards the company for the amount of electricity supplied to end
users by DG might be more appropriate.
Incentives should be appropriate to the technology they target and its level of
sophistication. If DG installations do not yet contribute much power to the grid, having just one
revenue driver to stimulate connections might be sufficient while having both a connection
revenue driver and a revenue driver for power contributed to the network by DG installations
might be overreaching. It will also be important to avoid designing inappropriate incentives that
over-remunerate distribution companies for a particular service. For example according to the
modeling results of chapter 3, when DG penetration is low to begin with, network costs can
decrease as DG penetration increases. At those penetration levels it may not make sense to
remunerate the distribution company for each new DG connection, when additional DG
connections in fact reduce some network costs.
A problem with creating incentives for specific technologies is the level of regulatory
specificity such design entails. A very new technology may not be incentivized if innovation
incentives are not also in place. As regulatory schemes become more complex, it is important to
consider not only the design of specific incentives, but also the effect of simultaneous operation
of multiple incentives in the regulatory scheme. Where possible, it might be efficient to design
an incentive suitable for several new technologies to minimize the added regulatory burden. The
time horizon of incentives is also important, and depends on the original objective of the
incentive. If an incentive was developed to stimulate connections of DG, it would be efficient to
remove the incentive when DG penetration has reached the desired level. Under the price control
system of incentive regulation, the operation of incentives can be regularly reviewed. This is
more difficult under cost of service regulation.
While it can be attractive to add specific modernization incentives to a regulatory
scheme, doing so can not necessarily substitute for ensuring appropriate remuneration via the
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underlying regulatory scheme. Merely adding incentives - for example for quality of service and
losses - to cost of service regulation in the US may be insufficient to meet all the challenges
posed by new technologies. For example, it would be ineffective to set a target for quality of
service while not allowing the company sufficient remuneration to invest in a new power
management system needed to maintain quality of service in the presence of DG.
5.2 Modeling Results and Regulation
As the applications of the Reference Network Models in this study demonstrate, new
technologies can have disparate impacts on network costs. Costs vary with penetration level and
location of distributed generation, and also depend on the presence or absence of active
management and the details of its implementation.
5.2.1 Modeling Distributed Generation and Regulatory Proposals
An awareness of how costs can change in the presence of new technologies is vital to
continued effective regulation of the distribution network. For distributed generation, the
modeling results show that with a 3 kW/unit power output, DG located near to customers could
decrease long-run network costs as DG penetration level increases until DG power contributions
approach net system demand (Figure 9). This result suggests it could be efficient to support DG
until that point through subsidies or a reduction in use of system charges. After DG begins to
supply a majority of demand, DG necessitates network investments and increases long-run
network costs. In that case, it would be necessary for DG to pay to remunerate the distribution
company so that they can make the necessary network investments.
For situations like the 3 kW/unit DG power output case modeled in Chapter 3, where
increasing DG penetration can change the trend of network investment costs from downwards to
upwards, ensuring adequate remuneration via appropriate cost recovery methods poses particular
problems. It may not be effective to fix a single connection charge for DG and keep it the same
for many years when increasing levels of DG in the network change costs so markedly.
Similarly, a direct revenue driver that increases the distribution company's revenue when more
DG is connected or more energy distributed originates from DG may not be efficient if DG
actually decreases the company's network costs up to a point. In such cases regulatory
approaches that take DG penetration forecasts into account may be especially appropriate. As
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suggested in Chapter 4, DG charges could be imposed ex ante incorporating forecasts for future
DG penetration. Upon connecting to the network DG would agree to a schedule of payments (or
subsidies) for the next x years, where the schedule takes into account forecast DG penetration
over x years. Having all DG agree to an ex ante payment schedule implies that after the point in
time at which DG is forecast to pay network costs, the costs can be socialized among all DG.
This could mitigate the potential inequity of ex post charging which might give rise to a situation
where DG connecting after a certain level of DG penetration has been achieved pays costs
whereas DG connecting before that period receives subsidies.
Additionally, the comparison of costs for near and far-DG show that losses costs can be
less for near-DG than far-DG, but these costs follow a U-shape pattern for near-DG (Figure 20).
Since losses costs decrease when the power contribution of near-DG is increasing from a low
level, the ex ante schedule of charges might recognize this by including a lower charge for new
near-DG when existing near-DG is not yet contributing much power to the network. This lower
charge can also send a locational signal to DG to locate near residential customers and ensure a
benefit to the network in terms of the reduction in losses costs. But since losses costs start
increasing when the power contributions from near-DG are high, the charges in the ex ante
schedule may be adjusted accordingly to ensure appropriate remuneration when such situations
are forecast.
If DG in an area is expected to be far away from customers rather than near to them, costs
are shown by the model to increase by a relatively small amount with DG penetration. Then, it
may be effective to remunerate for the additional costs via simple connection and use of system
charges. As the model suggests that the initial connection cost is small relative to the costs of
upgrading the network as the capacity of connected DG increases (for example, through
generator upgrades), the use of system charges may need be set progressively higher to recover
network costs in tandem with DG capacity upgrades.
A possible problem is that DG could decrease the amount of energy sold by conventional
generation. Where generation and retail businesses are separated from the distribution network
businesses (as in many countries that have adopted incentive regulation), this is generally not an
issue. But it may be a problem for vertically integrated businesses in the US that generate and
sell electricity alongside operating the distribution network. Such businesses might lose revenue
from electricity sales where these are displaced by DG.
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5.2.2 Modeling Network Management and Regulatory Proposals
The modeling results also demonstrate the benefits of active management in terms of
avoided network investment, while illustrating the importance of careful design and
implementation of active management programs. Actively managing connected technologies and
power flows decreases the required network investment costs relative to passive management.
The precise implementation of active management - whether it is time-shifting flexible power
demands to hours of low demand or spreading the power demand over a greater number of hours
- can also affect the benefits of active management seen. Time-shifting demand but not
spreading it over several hours, so that the peak demand does not change much in absolute value,
can lessen the benefit of active management in terms of network investment costs. As the
benefits of active management appear to be highly scenario-dependent, the results suggest that
companies must be encouraged to invest in active management yet be given freedom to design
their own implementations of active management (to optimize it for their networks). Hence the
detailed regulatory intervention in use for some advanced metering projects and reviewed in
Chapter 1 might be less appropriate for active management.
One regulatory measure that could directly encourage active management approaches
while avoiding excessive regulation of implementation details is funding pots. An example of
such a funding pot might be the UK's Low Carbon Networks funding program for innovative
projects leading to a low-carbon energy future, where most of the projects selected for funding
appear to be developing various implementations of active management (Office of Gas and
Electricity Markets (Ofgem) 2011). A recent review of the Low Carbon Networks program
found it to be "a significant success to date" (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem)
2011). Some of the projects funded by the US' Smart Grid Investment Grants funding pot also
target the development and implementation of active management of new technologies, but
others appear to be limited to funding installation of the new technologies without corresponding
changes in network management or operations (U.S. Department of Energy 2012).
Another regulatory measure that can encourage active management involves moving to
an outputs-based regulatory scheme and then setting appropriate output targets that stimulate
active management adoption. Some penalties or rewards for missing the targets may add to the
strength of such regulatory stimulus. For example, environmental targets such as reducing the
network's carbon footprint can encourage distribution companies not just to install AMI but also
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to implement demand response programs that use AMI to reduce customers' energy use and the
need to distribute energy through the network. As long as the output targets are met, this measure
allows companies the independence to utilize implementation approaches suitable for the
situations they face.
Long-term investment in active management approaches generally could also be
stimulated by allowing companies more liberty to choose between operational expenditure
(opex) and capital expenditure (capex). After the initial capital outlay on necessary equipment,
many active management expenses relate to the daily operations of the network and may be
classified as operational expenditure rather than capital expenditure. For example, the daily
operations of a demand response program including interacting with customers, sending them
appropriate price signals, and managing the power flows caused by changes in their energy
consumption, can all involve operational expenditure. As applied in incentive regulation, this
measure (suggested by the European DG-GRID project on distributed generation) implies
regulating the total sum of capex and opex instead of regulating them separately (Scheepers, et
al. 2007). This allows the company to choose the proportion of expenditure that is capital
expenditure and the proportion that is operational. On the other hand, when capex and opex are
regulated separately, the company's opex is benchmarked but capex is not. Since passive
network management involves installing wires and equipment of a large enough capacity to meet
the 'worst case' network power flow scenario, it can involve a larger capex outlay than active
management. So a scheme where capex is not benchmarked can make investing in passive
management more attractive than investing in active management (Scheepers, et al. 2007).
Regulating the total sum of capex and opex may therefore promote the choice of active over
passive management.
5.3 Conclusions and Further Research
The cost of integrating technologies like DG and management approaches like active
management into distribution networks is highly scenario-dependent, but models like the
Reference Network Model used in this study can readily analyze technology penetration
scenarios to provide an estimate of network costs for regulators. The continued development of
these models to improve computations of the network costs of new technologies would be a
valuable area of research.
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The remuneration of distribution companies for these costs can be improved through
outputs-based regulatory schemes and appropriate incentives. For the new technologies modeled
here, specific proposals are advanced such as ex ante charging schedules for certain types of
residentially located DG. For the active management approaches studied, reforms to regulatory
schemes are found to be useful in stimulating the appropriate investments: allowing companies
to divide their spending between capital and operational expenditure and allocating money to
funding pots for active management projects.
Further research in some areas will assist the development of better regulation. The RNM
is a distribution network-focused model that provides cost results for capital investments in the
networks, but not in the exogenous capital costs of new hardware or software systems also
needed to accommodate new technologies in the networks. More research is needed on the cost
trends of such systems and how they should affect regulatory remuneration; the data collected by
the US Smart Grid Investment Grants on smart grid project investments made to date may be a
useful starting point.
In conclusion, the modernizing electric distribution grid implies challenges for
distribution companies and regulators alike. Regulatory schemes and tools must modernize as
well to ensure distribution companies are remunerated appropriately for integrating modern
technologies into their networks. The application of effective regulation combined with active
engagement by distribution companies in improving electric distribution grids can provide
significant societal benefits.
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